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BEYOND CYBERSQUATTING:
TAKING DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES PAST
TRADEMARK POLICY
JacquelineD. Lipton*

All good "cyberlawyers"know that, in the late 1990s, legal and
regulatory measures were adopted, both at the domestic and
international level, to address the then-growing problem of
"cybersquatting": that is, the registration of often multiple
domain names correspondingto valuable corporate trademarks
with the intention of extorting high prices from the trademark
owners for transferring the names to them. Since 1999, the
Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy ("UDRP") in
particular,complemented by the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act ("ACPA"), has been very successful in combating
this practice. Unfortunately, since the late 1990s, there has
been little movement towards developing a comprehensive
system for domain name dispute resolution outside the
cybersquatting area. Little thought has been given to other
forms of domain name disputes that are not so well served by
the UDRP and the ACPA. Examples of these kinds of disputes
include certain complaints involving personal names and
cultural or geographic place names, as well as disputes
involving contests between two legitimate trademark holders.
This Article suggests the development of a new classification
scheme for different types of Internet domain name disputes
This new
outside the "bad-faith" cybersquatting context.
classification scheme highlights both the fact that the current
legal and regulatory framework is focused on only a narrow
class of domain name disputes and that the policies underlying
this framework are not suited to other categories of domain
name disputes. The Article further identifies ways in which
new solutions could be developed that are better suited to
domain name complaints outside the cybersquatting context
and that more appropriately reflect emerging social norms
about Internet usage and domain name registration.

* Associate Professor and Associate Director, Frederick K. Cox
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Ohio
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East
Boulevard,
Cleveland,
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INTRODUCTION

What's in a name? Plenty, if it is an Internet domain name.
They can be registered for fun or profit or simply to guide Internet
surfers to information that might interest them. Internet domain
names are big business. Unsurprisingly, it is their very capacity to
serve as business assets that has skewed the way that the legal
system has come to accommodate them in recent years.
In the early days of the Internet, law reviews and court
reporters were filled with discussions about how the law should
characterize Internet domain names, particularly in terms of their
relationship with trademark law.' However, with the advent of the
1. See Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 117, 121-22,
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Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA") 2 in the
United States and the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution
Policy ("UDRP")3 at a more global level, these discussions have
largely died down. People simply assume that we now have a
workable and efficient system in place to deal with legal disputes
about who might have the superior interest in a given domain name.
The problem is that the current dispute resolution mechanisms
are focused on the protection of commercial trademark interests,
often to the detriment of other socially important interests that may
inhere in a given domain name. If the global information society
continues down the current road of protecting these interests at all
costs, other important social norms relating to Internet use will not
have a chance to develop, and the Internet will become permanently
skewed in favor of commercial trademark interests. Thus, society
will miss out on the potential to develop the Internet in general, and
the domain name system in particular, in new and useful ways.
Even in the realm of purely commercial interests, the current
domain name dispute resolution mechanisms are somewhat lacking.
While the ACPA and the UDRP are extremely useful and effective in
protecting trademark interests in the bad-faith cybersquatting
context, 4 they are very limited in their ability to deal with disputes
124-33 (D. Mass. 1999), affd, 232 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000); Planned Parenthood
Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430, 1432-34, 1436-41 (S.D.N.Y.
1997), affd, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938
F. Supp 616, 618-19, 621-22 (C.D. Cal. 1996), affd 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998)
[hereinafter Panavision I]; Jacqueline Lipton, What's in a (Domain) Name?
Web Addresses as Loan Collateral, 2 J. INFO. L. & TECH (1999), at http://www2.

warwick.ac.uk/fac/soclaw/elj/jilt/1999-2/lipton (discussing the existence of
security interests or property rights in domain names); Robert L. Tucker,
Information Superhighway Robbery: The Tortious Misuse of Links, Frames,
90-138 (1999), at
Metatags and Domain Names, 4 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8,

http://www.vjolt.net/vol4/issue/v4i2a8-tucker.html; Carl Oppedahl, Remedies in
Domain Name Lawsuits: How is a Domain Name Like a Cow?, 15 J. MARSHALL
J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 437 passim (1997); Michael Tanner, Trademarks,
Internet Domain Names, and Network Solutions Incorporated:How Do We Fix a
12-21 (1998), at
System That is Already Broken?, 3 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 2,

http://grove.ufl.edu/-techlaw/vol3/issue2/tanner.html;

Ira

S.

Nathenson,

Comment, Showdown at the Domain Name Corral: Property Rights and
Personal Jurisdictionover Squatters, Poachers, and Other Parasites,58 U. PIrT.

L. REV. 911, 918-25 (1997).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c)-(d), 1129 (2000).
3. A copy of the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy may be
found at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm. (last modified Feb.
The UDRP was adopted by the Internet
5, 2002) [hereinafter UDRP].
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN") in 1999. Id.
4. For the purposes of this discussion, "cybersquatting" is conduct, usually
regarded as being in bad faith, in which an individual registers one or more
domain names corresponding to valuable registered trademarks with the
intention of profiting by selling those names to the trademark holder(s). See
Nathenson, supra note 1, at 925-26.
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between two legitimate holders of similar trademarks with respect
to a corresponding Internet domain name. 5
The time has come to develop some new approaches to domain
name disputes that can take account of interests in domain names
outside the bad-faith cybersquatting context. This Article suggests
a new classification scheme for different kinds of domain name
disputes.
The new scheme can serve as the basis for the
development of new approaches to Internet domain name dispute
resolution. The following discussion suggests individual remedial
mechanisms that might be developed to suit each specific category of
disputes. It also identifies the kinds of competing social values that
will likely need to be taken into account in future development of a
more comprehensive approach to domain name dispute resolution.
Part II explains the technical basis of the Internet domain name
system. It describes what Internet domain names are, how they
work, and why they are so commercially valuable. Part III sets out
the current regulatory framework for Internet domain name
disputes, focusing, as it does, on the prevention of bad-faith
cybersquatting.
It also considers the relationship between
traditional trademark policy and these newer domain name dispute
resolution procedures, suggesting that there is not necessarily a
particularly comfortable or logical fit between them. Part IV
develops a new classification scheme for different kinds of Internet
domain name disputes. It suggests that traditional cybersquatting
activities might continue to be regulated by the ACPA and the
UDRP while various new classes of Internet domain name disputes
might be regulated in other ways more suited to the types of legal,
social, and cultural interests implicated in the dispute. Suggestions
for how this may be achieved in practice are incorporated within the
discussion of each new proposed category of dispute.
Part V then sets out some conclusions on these issues, noting, in
particular, that time is now of the essence in developing new
approaches to domain name disputes. If we do not develop these
new approaches soon, we risk entrenching the current status quo.
This, in turn, would likely lead to the adoption of a default
regulatory policy suggesting that the only interests to be protected
5. This is not surprising, given that the first concern of the commercial
Internet community was bad-faith cybersquatting and not other kinds of
disputes, such as competitions between multiple legitimate trademarks. See
World Intellectual Property Organization Arbitration and Mediation Center,
New Generic Top-Level Domains: Intellectual PropertyConsiderations, 1 12-13,
at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/reports/newgtld-ip/printable.html (last visited
Nov. 22, 2005) [hereinafter New Generic Top-Level Domains]. However, it may
now be time to investigate domain name disputes with a broader focus, given
the kinds of cases now arising under traditional trademark law, the ACPA, and
the UIDRP. See infra notes 9, 28-29, 70, 93-95, 109, 114 and accompanying text.
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in the domain name context are commercially valuable trademark
rights. Such an outcome would be an unfortunate occurrence that
would likely contribute to the future development of the Internet as
a somewhat bland commercial medium, as opposed to facilitating
uses of Internet domain names that are more reflective of emerging
global social values and norms outside the purely commercial
context.
II.

INTERNET DOMAIN NAME BASICS

An Internet domain name is an alpha-numeric mnemonic device
that can be mapped onto an Internet Protocol ("IP") address to
enable users to "surf the Web" more easily than if they had to6
remember the details of each IP address they wanted to visit.

Numeric IP addresses tell a computer which World Wide Web
("Web") page to open, but are relatively meaningless to a human
Internet user. Internet domain names, on the other hand, can be
easily remembered because they are usually chosen in a form that
relates somehow to the entity whose Web site the person might
want to access: for example, microsoft.com for the Microsoft
Corporation.7
Clearly, a domain name can be a very valuable business asset,
in that it can operate like a combination trademark and shop front
that both assists customers in locating a commercial Web site and
can develop goodwill in the sense of attracting customers over a
period of time. Outside the purely commercial arena, Internet
domain names can also be valuable in helping people find specific
information, either as pointers to the information per se or as
pointers to a useful source of information (such as a government
information Web site, library Web site, university Web site, etc.).
Because of their uniqueness-a domain name can only map
onto one IP address at a time-and because of their potential value,
6. See H.L.

CAPRON

&

J.A.

JOHNSON,

COMPUTERS:

TOOLS

FOR

AN

543 (8th ed. 2004).
7. As the ICANN Web site elaborates:
The Domain Name System (DNS) helps users to find their way
around the Internet.
Every computer on the Internet has a unique
address-just like a telephone number-which is a rather complicated
string of numbers. It is called its "IP address" (IP stands for "Internet
Protocol"). IP Addresses are hard to remember. The DNS makes
using the Internet easier by allowing a familiar string of letters (the
"domain name") to be used instead of the arcane IP address. So
instead of typing 207.151.159.3, you can type www.internic.net. It is a
"mnemonic" device that makes addresses easier to remember.

INFORMATION AGE,

ICANN, FAQs: What is the Domain Name System?, at http://www.icann.org/faq/

#dns (last modified June 9, 2004).
8. Tucker, supra note 1, %90. This attribute makes domain names very
different from other forms of digital information property, in that domain
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the commercial and legal systems have struggled in recent years to
classify the status of domain names. Are domain names a form of
intellectual property or quasi property?9 If either, what should their
precise legal attributes be? Answering these questions has proved
to be somewhat more difficult in practice than one may have
thought, and a detailed discussion of the proprietary attributes of
Internet domain names is beyond the scope of this Article. However,
it may be that the new approaches to dispute resolution advocated
in this Article will alleviate the need to resolve some of these
questions, at least in the context of contests between two or more
parties10 as to who has the superior claim to a given Internet domain
name.
In terms of technical infrastructure, the domain name system is
administered by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers ("ICANN"). 11 ICANN is a private organization that

names are unique and rivalrous, whereas other valuable digital information
products, such as digital data, computer software, electronic databases, etc., all
involve non-rivalrous information which can be utilized by more than one
person at a time. Thus, implications for regulating domain names as a "scarce
resource" under traditional property theory may be more easily made out than
is the case for other forms of digital intellectual property. That discussion is
outside the focus of this Article, but it is worth noting by way of comparison
with other forms of digital information property.
9. See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding
that domain names are a form of intangible property for the purposes of the
California tort of conversion); Anupam Chander, The New, New Property, 81
TEx.L. REv. 715, 776-81 (2003) (arguing that the existence of property rights in
domain names is imperative to an attempt to create a more globally equitable
domain name system); Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Commercial Law Collides with
Cyberspace: The Trouble with Perfection-Insecurity Interests in the New
Corporate Asset, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 37, 62-71 (2002) (discussing the
importance of treating domain names as legal property in a transactional
context).
10. In any event, it is arguable that the debate over property or quasiproperty rights in Internet domain names has not advanced the ball very much
in terms of resolving disputes over Internet domain names that do not revolve
around traditional trademark interests. This Article takes what could be
described as a "bottom-up" approach to the problem. That is, it identifies
emerging social values and norms with respect to rights in Internet domain
names and attempts to categorize disputes and possible approaches to dispute
resolution in light of these social and cultural developments. Such an approach
could be contrasted with a "top-down" approach, which might identify potential
proprietary or quasi-proprietary attributes of Internet domain names and use
those categorizations as the basis for setting out a priority scheme for resolving
conflicts in domain name registration. E.g., Nathenson, supranote 1, at 925.
11. According to the organization's own Web site:
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) is an internationally organized, non-profit corporation that
has responsibility for Internet Protocol (IP) address space allocation,
protocol identifier assignment, generic (gTLD) and country code
(ccTLD) Top-Level Domain name system management, and root
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manages and coordinates the domain name system by overseeing
the distribution of unique IP addresses and domain names.12
However, actual domain name registration is handled by numerous
domain name registries situated in various countries around the
world. 3
When inserted into the address bar of an Internet browser,
domain names are usually preceded by the letters "http," which
stand for "hyper text transfer protocol." This is a set of rules that
provides the means of communicating on the Web." Moreover,
"http" is part of the Uniform Resource Locator ("URL"), which
directs the computer to the location of the desired Web page.
However, the domain name itself technically does not include the
protocol through which a Web page is accessed. The domain name
will generally commence with the letters "www" which indicates
that the domain name is part of the Web.' 5 The important part of
the domain name is what follows this prefix. It will usually include
the name of the server on which the Web page is stored. This may
be followed by some additional information relating to the file
structure of the Web page in question.
Different files and folders on a Web site may be indicated using
a backslash ("/") in the relevant address. For example, the address
http://www.icann.org/faq/#dns shows that the Web page in
question is stored on the "icann" server in a folder entitled "faq" and
Even without being a computer
subfolder called "#dns."
programmer or Internet aficionado, one can probably guess that this
is a part of the ICANN Web site that relates to the "domain name
system" in its "frequently asked questions" folder. Not all Web site
operators will make the file structure information available to users.
What is more important than the file structure of a Web page,
however, is the letters following the server information. In the
above example, the suffix of the domain name is ".org." This is an
server system management functions. These services were originally
performed under U.S. Government contract by the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority (IANA) and other entities. ICANN now performs
the IANA function.
ICANN, Welcome to ICANN!, at http://www.icann.org/new.html (last modified
Mar. 30, 2005).
12. ICANN, FAQs: What is ICANN?, at http://www.icann.org/faq/
#WhatisICANN (last modified June 9, 2004).
13. Internic, The Accredited RegistrarDirectory, at http://www.internic.net/
origin.html, (last updated Oct. 26, 2005) (listing Internet domain registries).
14. CAPRON &JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 562 (demonstrating that the World
Wide Web is a subset of sites on the Internet with text, images, and sounds
accessed via graphical user interfaces).
15. Id. Not all domain names start with "www." See, e.g., http://wipo.org
(last visited Nov. 22, 2005); http://elj.warwick.ac.uk (last modified Sept. 1,
2005).
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example of a generic Top-Level Domain ("gTLD"), connoting that the
operator of the Web site is an organization. The most popular
gTLDs, at least on a commercial level, are ".com,". ".org," and ".net."
That is because these names connote organizations or business
operations, and are not tied to any particular geographical location,
so they appear to be more global or universal than domain names
suffixed by a country-code Top-Level Domain ("ccTLD"), such as
".uk" for the United Kingdom, ".ca" for Canada, and ".au" for
Australia. 16
There are many other forms of gTLDs that are not countryspecific. They include ".edu," which is used predominantly for
educational institutions, and ".gov," which is used for governmental
In November 2000, ICANN released seven new
departments.
gTLDs because of concerns that the existing gTLDs were being
exhausted and that alternatives were not available for people and
businesses who needed them. 17 Some of the new gTLDS were
specific to a particular area of operation and some were more
general.' 8 The new gTLDs are: ".aero," for the aviation community;
".biz," for business purposes; ".coop," for cooperatives; ".info," for
general, unrestricted use; ".museum." for museums; ".name," for
personal names; and ".pro," for professionals.1 9
Additionally, as noted above, the domain name system caters to
Many businesses use country-code specific top-level
ccTLDs.
domains, or have more than one Web site, including a country-code
specific Web site and a more generic Web site. An obvious example
is Amazon.com, Inc., which, in addition to its namesake Web site,
boasts an amazon.co.uk site for the United Kingdom, an amazon.de
site for Germany, an amazon.fr site for France, an amazon.co.jp site
for Japan, and an amazon.ca site for Canada. 0
16. ICANN, FAQs: I've Seen Domain Names Ending with Two-Letter
Combinations, Like .uk. What are the Rules for Registering in These Domains?,
at http://www.icann.org/faq/#cctlds (last modified June 9, 2004).
17. ICANN, Top-Level Domains (gTLDs), at http://www.icann.orgtlds (last
modified Dec. 16, 2003).
18. See id.
19. World Intellectual Property Organization, Registry Specific Policies (in
addition to the UDRP), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/gtld/registry/index.
html (last visited Nov. 22, 2005).
Query Result, at http://195.66.240.211/cgi-bin/whois.
20. WHOIS,
cgi?query=amazon.co.uk&x=7&y=12 (last visited Nov. 22, 2005); DENIC,
Domain Query-Results, at http://www.denic.de/en/whois/data.jsp (last updated
Aug. 25, 2004) (displaying Amazon as the domain holder when "amazon" is
entered in the domain query search field); AFNIC, WHOIS, at http://www.affnic.
fr/outils/whois (last visited Nov. 22, 2005) (displaying Amazon as the domain
holder when "amazon.fr" is entered in the nom de domaine search field); !JP,
WHOIS, at http://whois.jprs.jp/en (last updated Dec. 1, 2004) (displaying
Amazon as the domain holder when "amazon.co.jp" is entered in the whois
search keyword field); Canadian Internet Registry Authority, Information on
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Herein lies one of the problems of the domain name system from
the "competing interests" perspective: nothing in the domain name
system prevents one corporation from monopolizing various forms of
a particular domain name.2 This may or may not be problematic
where there is only one party with a likely interest in a particular
name. However, where more than one party might have competing
interests in the same name, a system that allows for the
monopolization of multiple versions of the name by one entity can
If Amazon.com can hold all the above-listed
create problems.
domain names as well as adding new country code versions of its
name and perhaps even new generic versions of its name, such as
amazon.net or amazon.biz, does this cause a problem for other
in maintaining a Web
entities with objectively legitimate interests
22
site with "amazon" in the domain name?

III. THE CURRENT LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
FOR INTERNET DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES
Domain Names and Trademark Policy
The current approaches to Internet domain name disputes focus
on protecting holders of trademarks from bad-faith registrations and
uses of domain names that correspond to relevant trademark
interests. In some senses, this is an unusual extension of trademark
policy into a new area of legal regulation. This development is
remarkable because traditional trademark law and policy is aimed
at preventing consumer confusion about the source and, to some
extent, the quality of particular goods or services.2 3 More recently,
trademark legislation has been utilized to protect famous
trademarks against dilution.24 The idea of importing a notion of bad

A.

(last
Domain, at http://whois.cira.ca/public?domaine=amazon.ca&langue=en
visited Nov. 22, 2005).
21. In fact, a recent report by the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO") shows that the new gTLDs with little to no registration restrictions
had the most number of "repeat registrants" and the lowest number of new
registrants, suggesting that a large number of new domain names were
registered defensively by people who already held corresponding domain names
in other gTLD spaces such as ".com," ".org," or ".net." New Generic Top-Level
Domains, supra note 5, 21.
22. Amazon.com has already registered amazon.biz and mapped that
domain name on to the IP address for the amazon.com Web site. .BIZ Registry,
WHOIS Data, at http://www.whois.biz/whois.cgi?TLD=biz&dn=amazon&TYPE=
DOMAIN&Search=Submit+Query (last visited Nov. 22, 2005).
23. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000); JEROME GILSON & ANNE GILSON
LALONDE, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 1.03(1) (2005).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (providing the definition of "dilution" from the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995); GILSON, supra note 23, § 5A.01
(detailing the new federal trademark dilution legislation of 1995).
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faith into trademark policy as the basis for a cause of action in the
"cyberpiracy" context has been a more recent development. It is
largely an outgrowth of early Internet domain name disputes in
which bad-faith registration of a domain name seemed a significant
factor taken into account by courts in holding that a particular
domain name registration or use amounted to a trademark
infringement.2 5
Consider, for example, the now famous--or infamous-litigation
involving "cyber-pirate" Dennis Toeppen's multiple registrations of
Internet domain names corresponding to famous corporate
trademarks in the early days of the Internet.26 Trademark
infringement holdings against Toeppen seemed to be based as much
on courts being convinced that Toeppen's actions were morally
wrong as on the application of trademark law to the facts. Judges
were prepared to hold that Toeppen's offers to sell the relevant
domain names to the "rightful" owners were commercial uses of
trademarks despite the fact that such activities were not the kinds
of commercial uses traditionally associated with trademark law as
27
the basis for a successful infringement action.
The language of some of these judgments suggests significant
concern with immoral or bad-faith activities involving domain
names, regardless of how well the facts of a given case fit the
traditional trademark infringement model.
In Panavision
International, L.P. v. Toeppen,28 for example, Judge Thompson
stated that:
[Toeppen's] use [of the relevant marks] is not as benign as he
suggests. Toeppen's "business" is to register trademarks as
domain names and then sell them to the rightful trademark
owners. He "act[s] as a 'spoiler,' preventing Panavision and
others from doing business on the Internet under their
trademarked names unless they pay his fee."29
There is an obvious concern here with benign uses of marks versus
25. Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324-25 (9th Cir.
1998) [hereinafter PanavisionIII.
26. See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (requiring "commercial use" of a mark for a
trademark dilution action); id. § 1125(c)(4)(B) (preventing a successful
trademark dilution action if the defendant has only made a noncommercial use
of the relevant mark).
28. 141 F.3d 1316.
29. Id. at 1325 (quoting Panavision 1, 938 F. Supp 616, 619 (C.D. Cal.
1996)). See also Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (making similar observations about Toeppen's cybersquatting conduct
amounting to a "commercial use" of the relevant mark for the purposes of
trademark law).
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bad-faith uses. The plaintiffs are regarded as "rightful" owners of
the trademarks, ° which is unquestionable. However, little judicial
thought is given to whether those rightful owners of the marks
should also be rightful owners of corresponding domain names.
As a result of growing judicial, corporate, and legislative
concern about bad-faith registrations of Internet domain names in
the early- to mid-1990s, action was taken at both the international
and domestic levels to create domain name dispute resolution
procedures that would protect trademark holders against such badfaith registrations.3 These procedures were aimed at protecting
trademark holders against activities such as those conducted by
Toeppen in the mid-1990s. 32 Thus, they are somewhat narrow in

their scope and, even though they protect trademark holders against
certain bad-faith conduct, they are in some ways outside of
traditional trademark policy. They do not necessarily prevent
consumer confusion or trademark dilution in the traditional
trademark sense, 3 but rather preserve commercial property
interests in trademarks against bad-faith cybersquatting activities.
This has led to some difficulties of application and
interpretation in cases that are not traditional cybersquatting
situations. In some ways, standard cybersquatting activities are the
"easy cases," once the legal and regulatory system has identified
them as a legal wrong. However, other forms of Internet domain
name disputes are more problematic. This Article focuses on
identifying and categorizing those other forms of Internet domain
name disputes that have been emerging in recent years as difficult
cases under the new forms of domain name dispute resolution. It
further suggests new approaches to resolving these emerging
categories of domain name disputes on the basis of perceived social
and cultural values in the global information age. However, before
categorizing these forms of disputes, it is worth briefly surveying the
current approaches to domain name dispute resolution.
B.

Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-ResolutionPolicy

The main source of dispute resolution rules that apply to
domain names is the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution
Policy, promulgated by ICANN. 3'4 The UDRP is a form of private
30. PanavisionII, 141 F.3d at 1325.
31. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
32. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
33. For example, in the Panavisioncase, Toeppen had posted aerial photos
of the town of Pana, Illinois, on the relevant Web site, which would, by itself, be
unlikely to cause any consumer confusion, although it is arguable that it might
dilute the Panavision trademark. Panavision11, 141 F.3d at 1325.
34. See UDRP, supra note 3.
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regulation that is implemented through various organizations
accredited by ICANN, the most significant of which is the World
Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO").

35

The UDRP is a

relatively fast, and
private, international, inexpensive,
predominantly online 37 dispute resolution procedure for situations in
which a complainant is disputing the,registration of a domain name.
The UDRP does not oust the jurisdiction of national courts.38
However, all domain name registrants are contractually bound to
submit to a mandatory arbitration under the UDRP if a complaint is
made under the UDRP about the registration of one or more
relevant domain names.3' This dispute is managed by arbitrators
licensed by one of the organizations charged with hearing disputes
under the UDRP.4 ° It involves the receipt of a complaint and a
response by the registrant. 4' The arbitrator or panel then provides a
decision and resolution based on this material.42 There are generally
no in-person hearings. 43 The only orders that can be made under the
UDRP are orders for cancellation of a disputed name or for transfer
of a domain name to the complainant."
The grounds on which a decision is made under the UDRP are
based on commercial considerations that largely resemble some of
the key elements of trademark law, as well as the bad-faith concerns
identified above in relation to domain name registration. 41
Complaints under the UDRP mechanism generally must relate to a
domain name registered in a way that misuses a registered
trademark or service mark.46 A complaint must be made on the

35. World Intellectual Property Organization, Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Resources, at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/resources/index.html
(last visited Nov. 22, 2005).
36. World Intellectual Property Organization, Schedule of Fees under the
ICANN UDRP Policy, at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/fees/index.html (Dec. 1,
2002).
37. See, e.g., ICANN, Rules for Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution
Policy, at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm (Oct. 24, 1999)
[hereinafter Rules for UDRP] (listing clause 13 of the Rules for the UDRP,
which forbids in-person hearings except when deemed necessary).
38. See UDRP, supra note 3, §§ 3(b), 4(k).
39. Id. § 4. The UDRP is incorporated by reference into domain name
registration agreements. See id. § 1.
40. See Rules for UDRP, supranote 37, §§ 1, 6.
41. Id. §§ 3(a), 4(a), 5(a).
42. Id. § 15.
43. Id. § 13 ("There shall be no in-person hearings (including hearings by
teleconference, videoconference, and [Wieb conference), unless the Panel
determines, in its sole discretion and as an exceptional matter, that such a
hearing is necessary for deciding the complaint.").
44. Id. § 4(i).
45. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
46. See UDRP, supra note 3, § 4(a)-(c).
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basis of the three grounds set out in Paragraph 4(a) of the UDRP:
(i) [that the disputed] domain name is identical or
confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which
the complainant has rights; and
(ii) [that the registrant has] no rights or legitimate interests
in respect of the domain name; and
(iii) [that the] domain name has been registered and is being
used in bad faith.47
The UDRP provides guidance about how a registrant can
demonstrate rights or legitimate interests in a domain name in
response to an arbitration claim,4 ' and also about what evidence a
complainant might bring to support an allegation that the registrant
is using the name in bad faith.49 With respect to the former, the
UDRP sets out some factors that a registrant may use to
demonstrate a legitimate interest in a disputed domain name. In
particular she might show that:
(i) before any notice to [her] of the dispute, [she had] use of,
or [made] demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name
or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection
with a bona fide offering of goods or services; or
(ii) [she] (as an individual, business, or other organization)
[has] been commonly known by the domain name, even if [she]
[has] acquired no trademark or service mark rights [in the
name]; or
(iii) [she is] making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of
the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to
misleadingly divert customers or to tarnish the trademark or
service mark at issue.5 °
This is an inclusive list; an arbitrator or panel might consider
other evidence presented to support an argument that the registrant
has a legitimate interest in the domain name in question. 5'
However, the list as it stands is obviously focused on the protection
47. Id. § 4(a)(i)-(iii).
48. See id. § 4(c).
49. See id. § 4(b).

50. Id. § 4(c)(i)-(iii).
51. See id. § 4(c).
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of trademark rights and related interests in commerce, rather than
protecting any other interests.
In terms of evidence of bad-faith use, the UDRP includes a nonexclusive list of factors that might indicate a bad-faith use of a
domain name. 52 These are based largely on concerns about
cybersquatting that arose in the early to mid-1990s. The bad-faith
factors set out in the UDRP relate to the claimant establishing:
(i) circumstances indicating that [she has] registered or...
acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling,
renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name
registration to the complainant, [where the complainant] is the
owner of the trademark or service mark, or to a competitor of
the complainant, for valuable consideration ... ; or
(ii) [that the registrant has] registered the domain name in
order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark
from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name,
provided that [the registrant has] engaged in a pattern of such
conduct; or
(iii) [that the registrant has] registered the domain name
primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a
competitor; or
(iv) [that,] by using the domain name, [the registrant has]
intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain,
Internet users to [the registrant's] Web site .

.

. by creating a

likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as to the
source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of [the
registrant's] Web site or location or of a product or service
[available on that] Web site or location. 3
Again, we see the concept of bad faith linked with traditional
Some of the
trademark and unfair-competition-law principles.
UDRP's bad-faith factors relate clearly to cybersquatting activities,
while others reflect more traditional trademark concerns, such as
the prevention of consumer confusion.54 Various assumptions have
been made in drafting the UDRP in terms of the values that should
be promoted on the Internet, at least in terms of domain name
registration. The overriding emphasis is clearly on the protection of

52. See id. § 4(b).
53. Id. § 4(b)(i)-(iv).
54. See id.
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Western commercial trademark interests, 55 presumably in an
attempt to avoid chilling the development of electronic commerce
over the Internet.
However, there is no reason that the UDRP or any other set of
rules and regulations governing competing interests in Internet
domain names needs to be focused so sharply on protecting
trademarks, although, presumably, those principles should play
some role in domain name governance. Why, for example, is there
an assumption that trademark rights are more important with
respect to domain names than are individuals' rights to use their
own personal names as domain names 6 or the rights of cultural
groups to use geographical identifiers or other culturally significant
words?57 Presumably this is because Western government policy has
been more concerned with protecting and promoting the
development of electronic commerce in recent years 58 than in
promoting other values on the Internet.
Even if the view is taken that government policies should focus
on protecting the development of electronic commerce above other
interests on the Internet, is it necessarily true that the most
efficient way to do that is through applying modified trademark and
unfair-competition-law principles to the Internet? Consider, for
example, the bad-faith factors from the UDRP, as well as the
The UDRP clearly
Toeppen litigation described above. '9
contemplates that a person who has trademark rights corresponding
to a registered domain name also has the right to prevent
cybersquatting activities. ° In other words, the trademark holder
55. See id. § 4(a)-(c).
56. It is noteworthy that the UDRP envisages that the assertion of a
legitimate interest in a domain name corresponding to a personal name is
effectively a defense to a UDRP arbitration proceeding. Id. § 4(c)(ii). However,
there is no right to bring a complaint under the UDRP based on a right in a
personal name corresponding to a given domain name. See infra note 80 and
accompanying text. More recently, ICANN introduced the ".name" gTLD partly
as an alternative domain space for registering interests in personal names.
However, this domain space has not proved as popular as ".com," even for many
personal names. There have certainly been very few disputes involving ".name"
domain names. New Generic Top-Level Domains, supra note 5,

103.

57. See Chander, supra note 9, at 717.
58. For example, on July 3, 2000, President Bill Clinton signed the
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act. Clinton Signs
Electronic Signatures Bill,

TECH L.J.

(July

3,

2000),

at

http://www.

Further, in February 2000,
techlawjournal.com/internet/20000703.htm.
President Clinton publicly stated his opposition to any taxation of the Internet.
David McGuire, Clinton Comes Out Against "Discriminatory"Net Taxes,

NEWSBYTES PM (Feb. 14, 2000), available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/
articles/mi_m0HDN/is_2000_Feb_14ai_596945 05/print.
59. See supranotes 25-33, 52-53 and accompanying text.
60. See UDRP, supranote 3, § 4(a)-(b).
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should be able to prevent another person from registering a domain
name corresponding to her trademark in order to sell it to her or one
of her competitors for a profit.
There is clearly an underlying assumption here that
cybersquatting is a dishonest and unfair activity and should be
discouraged. But is this a valid assumption? Can it be empirically
proven that it is not, in fact, more efficient to allow cybersquatting
and let the market sort itself out in terms of who eventually gains
access to particular domain names? Presumably, a cybersquatter
will not be able to sell a domain name to an organization with a
corresponding trademark at a price that is greater than the domain
name is worth to the organization. Thus, is it not possible that an
efficient market in domain names would arise in the commercial
arena without any form of regulation or, alternatively, with a form
of regulation that generally allows cybersquatting when it appears
to be economically efficient but limits or restricts such activities if
they are causing market disruption? Under such regulation, a
cybersquatter would be forbidden from holding domain names
hostage for exorbitant prices, rather than selling them to the
"rightful" owners for reasonable market values.
Such a model could be derived from ideas underlying
government-monitored compulsory licensing schemes found in some
Under such a scheme, the
countries' patent legislation. 61
government would intervene where the market is unable to come to
a socially and economically beneficial solution. Of course, the
obvious counterargument is that there is no social value in
encouraging these cybersquatting activities and, as a result, there is
no good reason to allow such markets to develop. Nevertheless,
analogies may be made with the physical world of land ownership
where property speculators buy land with little worth for them,
aside from the potential that it will be more valuable in the hands of
another who may want to purchase it for a significantly higher
62
price. Is there any reason to regulate differently in the virtual
world of domain name registrations?
In any event, there are other, less clear-cut variations on this
theme. An obvious example of a more complicated situation is that
in which two or more people or businesses each have legitimate
commercial interests in a particular domain name. If one of them
has registered the name, but it is worth more to one of the other
corresponding trademark holders, is it not possible that market
61. See, e.g., Patents Act, 1977, § 48 (Eng.); Patents Act, 1990, § 133
(Austl.).
62. See generally Nguyen, supra note 9, at 60 (suggesting that the
"secondary market for domain names often has been compared to real estate
speculation").
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forces will determine who ultimately gets to use the domain name?63
Presumably, the person to whom it is worth the most will pay that
price to obtain the name from the registrant without any specific
regulation. This type of situation is not well catered for under the
The UDRP operates under the
UDRP as currently drafted.
assumption that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred
in circumstances when one person has a legitimate interest in the
domain name based on a corresponding trademark or service mark
and another person has registered or used the name in bad faith.64
That paradigm does not cover the situation in which two or more
organizations have competing legitimate interests in the same
domain name. 65 This is an obvious example of the current system's
limitations with respect to resolving domain name disputes even
within the purely commercial trademark context.
Anticybersquatting Consumer ProtectionAct
Around the time that the UDRP was implemented, Congress
enacted the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999.66
This legislation added provisions to the Lanham Act 6 7 in order to
protect domain names that correspond to a registered trademark
against bad-faith registrations. 68 Like the UDRP, this legislation
was ratified in response to concerns about cybersquatting activities
69
It is arguable
such as those conducted by Dennis Toeppen.
whether the ACPA actually adds anything substantial to domestic
trademark law, given that judges were already prepared to find that
cybersquatting constituted a "commercial use" of a trademark, as
required for a trademark infringement action under the Lanham
Act. " However, it does potentially streamline legal proceedings
involving domain names and adds further protections for domain
names corresponding to personal names. 71
The ACPA establishes a civil action against a person who
registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name corresponding to a
trademark with a bad-faith intent to profit from the mark.7 2 For
these purposes, a "personal name which is protected as a mark" is
C.

63. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
64. UDRP, supra note 3, § 4(a)-(b), (i).
65. See id. § 4(c).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).
67. Id. §§ 1051-1141.
68. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A).
69. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
70. See Panavision 11, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324-25 (9th Cir. 1998); see also
Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1129.
72. Id. § 1125(d)(1).
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included in the concept of trademark.73 Bad faith is defined in terms
that relate to knowing and unauthorized incursions into a
complainant's trademark rights that correspond to the domain
name.7 ' A defense may be mounted if the defendant "believed and
had reasonable grounds to believe that [her] use of the domain name
was a fair use [under American trademark law] or was otherwise
lawful." 75 In terms of remedies, the ACPA empowers a court to
"order the forfeiture or cancellation of [a] domain name or the
transfer of [a] domain name to the owner of [a relevant
trademark] .,76

With respect to any bad-faith intent to profit from a trademark
by using a domain name, the ACPA takes an approach similar to the
UDRP's bad-faith test, in setting out an inclusive list of factors that
may be taken into account by a court to determine bad faith.77 As
with the UDRP bad-faith factors, the ACPA bad-faith factors rely
significantly
on
assumptions
about
the
immorality
of
cybersquatting.
The bad-faith factors in the ACPA, though,
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§§ 1125(d)(1)(A), 1129.
§ 1125(d)(1)(B)(i).
§ 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii).
§ 1125(d)(1)(C).

77. This list of bad-faith factors includes:
(I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the
[defendant], if any, in the domain name;
(II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal
name of the [defendant] or a name that is otherwise commonly used to
identify [the defendant];
(III) the [defendant's] prior use, if any, of the domain name in
connection with the bona fide offering of any goods or services;
(IV)the [defendant's] bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the
[trade]mark in a [Webisite accessible under the domain name;
(V) the [defendant's] intent to divert consumers from the
[tradelmark owner's online location to a [Webisite accessible under
the domain name that could harm the goodwill represented by the
[trade]mark, either for commercial gain or with intent to tarnish or
disparage the [trade]mark;
(VI) the [defendant's] offer to transfer.., the domain name to the
mark owner or any third party for financial gain without having used,
or having an intent to use, the domain name in the bona fide offering
of any goods or services, or the [defendant's] prior conduct indicating a
pattern of such conduct;
(VII) the [defendant's] provisions of material and misleading false
contact information when applying for the registration of the domain
name, [the defendant's] intentional failure to maintain accurate
contact information, or the [defendant's] prior conduct indicating a
pattern of such conduct; [and]
(VIII) the [defendant's] registration or acquisition of multiple
domain names which the [defendant] knows are identical or
confusingly similar to marks of others that are distinctive at the time
of registration of such domain names ....

Id. § l125(d)(1(B)(i)(I)--(VI).
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contemplate additional protection for a defendant's right to use her
personal name as it may be incorporated into a domain name.'8 This
factor is not necessarily determinative in a given case but is just one
item that may be taken into account by a court.
Furthermore, personal names receive specific protection under
section 1129(1)(A), which states that:
Any person who registers a domain name that consists of the
name of another living person, or a name substantially and
confusingly similar thereto, without that person's consent,
with the specific intent to profit from such name by selling the
domain name for financial gain to that person or any third
79
party, shall be liable in a civil action by such person.
This provision allows personal names to be used as the basis of
a complaint under the ACPA in a manner not contemplated in the
UDRP. 80 However, there may be some question as to whether such a
provision rightfully belongs in the ACPA, particularly as it
apparently covers personal names that are not utilized for
commercial trademark purposes. Once again, emerging domain
name policy is blurring the boundaries of traditional trademark law.
The ACPA includes some additional bad-faith factors that are
not expressly contemplated in the UDRP, such as the defendant's
failure to provide or maintain accurate contact information in a
domain name registry, which is seen as potential evidence of a badfaith intent to profit from a trademark corresponding to a domain
name.81 The ACPA also expressly suggests that the practice of
registering multiple domain names that correspond to existing
trademarks might be evidence of bad faith.82 Again, this is based on
the assumption that such conduct deserves to be prohibited.
With respect to personal names, despite the provisions of
section 1129(1)(A) of the ACPA, it is not clear that society has
reached the point where individuals are prepared, or even aware of
their right, to litigate to protect their personal names when those
names do not correspond to commercially valuable trademarks. In
fact, many such individuals may not have the financial resources to
avail themselves of these provisions in a courtroom. Additionally,
78. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(II).
79. Id. § 1129(1)(A).
80. The UDRP only contemplates personal names being used to establish a
legitimate interest in a domain name by way of a defense to a UDRP complaint.
UDRP, supra note 3, § 4(c)(ii). There is no right to bring a complaint under the
UDRP based on a right in a personal name that corresponds to a given domain
name. Id. § 4(a)(ii), (c)(ii).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VII).
82. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VIII).
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this remedy may only be available to people who live in, or have
some significant connection with, the United States. 3 In any event,
the ACPA does not protect any other interests in domain namessuch as a cultural group's interest in a domain name corresponding
to a geographical place or a religious icon.8 Overall, the ACPA's
approach to cybersquatting largely mirrors that of the UDRP.85
Both are skewed in favor of protecting Western-style commercial
trademark interests against various kinds of bad-faith incursions.
If a broader global policy on domain name rights and interests
is to be developed in the future, any domestic legislation would have
to mirror the terms of such a policy or, at least, not significantly
contradict the policy. If individual jurisdictions are encouraged to
legislate independently of each other for various issues involving
domain names, an unworkable patchwork could ensue of laws which
are not globally harmonized among nations or even, in federal
states, nationally harmonized among political subdivisions. The
recent interest in state-based laws relating to "political
cybersquatting" in the United States86 may be an emerging example
of such failure to create a harmonized approach to disputes
involving personal names in cyberspace where the UDRP and the
ACPA fall short of resolving the relevant disputes.
Now may be a good time for the global community to start
identifying interests in domain names, other than commercial
trademark interests, that may need to be protected in cyberspace in
the future. It would certainly be preferable if global attention were
paid to this issue and thought were given to a harmonized approach
to resolving relevant disputes, rather than leaving the issues for
piecemeal and potentially contradictory or disharmonized national
regulation. It may not be a particularly difficult task to identify the
kinds of interests that would need to be taken into account in
developing a new global policy for Internet domain names, as some
of the more salient issues are currently arising in disputes
arbitrated under the UDRP and argued
in domestic courts under
87
trademark law, including the ACPA.
It seems that the disputes currently arising under the UDRP
and the ACPA are beginning to point the way to the kinds of
83. But see Steven J. Coran, Note, The Anticybersquatting Consumer
ProtectionAct's In Rem Provision:Making American TrademarkLaw the Law of
the Internet?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 169 (2001) (demonstrating that the ACPA,
through its in rem provision, imposes American law on parties outside the
United States).
84. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).
85. Compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(d), 1129 with UDRP, supra note 3.
86. See California Political Cyberfraud Abatement Act, CAL. ELEc. CODE
§§ 18320-23 (Deering Supp. 2005); discussion infra Part IV.E.2.
87. See discussion infra Part IV.C-F.
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balancing exercises that will need to be conducted in the future in
relation to domain name policy. 88 Many of these disputes evidence
distinctly different concerns to the original problem of protecting
trademark holders against bad-faith cybersquatters. Some of the
more salient classes of disputes are examined below.
This
discussion highlights the shortcomings of the existing dispute
resolution models in resolving these disputes. It also suggests new
approaches to resolving these various different classes of disputes,
based on an attempt to cater to emerging social, cultural, and
economic values in the global information age. This may ultimately
lead to a more workable global system based on social and cultural
expectations of Internet usage.
IV. CATEGORIZING DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES
AND APPROPRIATE REMEDIES

A.

Crafting a Domain Name Dispute ClassificationScheme

One reason for advocating an expanded approach to domain
name dispute resolution policy is that an approach based
predominantly on protecting commercial trademarks against
cybersquatters has a number of shortcomings. This has become
obvious in the disputes that have come before courts and UDRP
arbitrators in recent years.89 Additionally, the current system may
prevent adequate consideration of matters that do not readily
translate into ACPA or UDRP terms because of implicit
assumptions in those systems about who has "better" rights in
domain names. For example, now that the idea of domain names as
trademark equivalents has taken hold, those who might otherwise
have asserted an interest in a domain name because, for example, it
corresponds to their personal name or a cultural interest, might now
choose not to bother. They may simply assume that they do not, and
are not intended to, have any legal entitlements to the relevant
domain name.
Domain name disputes currently come in many different forms,
and the following discussion might not consider all possible
permutations and combinations of interests that could arise in
relation to a domain name. However, it does address a variety of
different kinds of domain name disputes that have arisen in recent
years, some of which clearly fit more neatly within traditional
trademark or unfair-competition paradigms than others. Drawing
from the recent history of domain name disputes, it is possible to
88. See, e.g., infra Part IV.D.
89. See, e.g., infra Part IV.E.2 (discussing the domain name dispute arising

out of Kathleen Kennedy Townsend's 2002 Maryland gubernatorial campaign).
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suggest a new classification scheme for such disputes as follows.
This scheme evidences the fact that the cybersquatting cases
catered for in the ACPA and the UDRP only make up a small
proportion of the overall number of potential disputes.90 The classes
of disputes identified below also clearly lend themselves to new
practical approaches to dispute resolution as detailed in the
following discussion. Domain name disputes that have arisen in
recent years might be classified as follows.
(1) "Classic" Cybersquatting: This category of disputes covers
situations in which a person has registered one or more domain
names that correspond to well-known trademarks with a view to
commercial profit by offering to transfer the domain name(s) to a
party interested in the trademark for valuable consideration. This
has been considered a bad-faith practice 9' and has been relatively
successfully regulated by the ACPA and the UDRP since 1999, as
detailed above. 2 Thus, the following discussion does not deal in any
detail with new approaches to this class of disputes as compared
with the other classes set out below.
(2) "Noncommercial" Cybersquatting: This category refers to
situations in which a person has registered usually only one domain
name, but possibly more, for a predominantly noncommercial
purpose. An obvious example might be where a person has
registered a domain name corresponding to another person's
trademark in order to use the domain name in a Web site that
Recent
comments on the activities of the trademark holder.
examples in the United States have involved registrations of a
domain name corresponding to the Planned Parenthood
trademark, 93 the People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
("PETA") trademark, 94 and the Bosley Medical Institute trademark. 95
90. See infra Part IV.C-F (examining categories of potential domain name
disputes arising outside the scope of the ACPA and the UDRP).
91. As noted above, this proposition may be debatable. See supra
pp. 115-116. However, it is assumed for the purposes of this article that the
decision has been made at a policy level that "classic" cybersquatting is a badfaith practice that infringes trademark policy and needs to be regulated on that
basis.
92. See supra notes 52-53, 77-82 and accompanying text.
93. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430
(S.D.N.Y. 1997), afd, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998). Some people may regard
this case-discussed in more detail infra Part IV.C.1-as an example of "classic"
cybersquatting in the sense that the domain name registrant was attempting to
divert traffic from the Web sites of a "rightful trademark owner." However,
unlike the Toeppen litigation, the purpose of the registration here was not to
extort money from the rightful trademark owner but to expose those who might
want to visit the Planned Parenthood Web site to a competing point of view on
issues like contraception, abortion, family planning, etc. Id. at 1433.
94. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Doughney, 263
F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001).
95. Bosley Med. Inst. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2005).
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Such conduct is perhaps not truly cybersquatting in the "classic"
sense of the term, because the registrant is actually using the name
herself for a particular purpose-commentary, parody, etc.-rather
than for purposes of extorting money from a person with an interest
in a corresponding trademark. This may, or may not, justify
separate treatment in the dispute resolution arena than "classic"
cybersquatting cases, depending on the circumstances.
"Noncommercial" in this context is not a term of art. A person
who registers a domain name with a purpose of making commentary
on a particular issue may have a secondary purpose of commercial
profit, as the following discussion demonstrates. This category of
disputes might more appropriately be referred to as "First
Amendment Cybersquatting" or something similar. However, the
"noncommercial" label has been applied here with the aim of
encompassing a potentially broader class of cases than just free
speech cases.96
(3) Contest between Multiple Legitimate Interests: This category
covers situations in which two or more people have what might be
called a "legitimate" interest in the same domain name, which would
occur, for example, when two or more companies have a similar
trademark that corresponds with a particular domain name.97 Thus,
it encompasses those situations where multiple legitimate interest
holders are competing for the same domain name.
(4) Disputes Involving Personal Names: This category of
disputes may be further subcategorized into: (i) disputes involving
celebrity names (for example, actors, musicians, sports stars, etc.);98
(ii) disputes involving politician names; 99 and (iii) disputes involving
names of private individuals.100 These issues come in different
flavors. A number of recent examples are provided below.
(5) Culturally Significant Names, Geographical Locators, etc.:
This is a somewhat miscellaneous category of disputes for which
96. An obvious example might be Joshua Quittner's registration of the

mcdonalds.com domain name in the early days of the domain name system. See
infra Part IV.C.5. This case was never actually litigated and it may or may not
truly be classified as a free speech issue. The purpose of the registration here
was to demonstrate the workings of the domain name system in the early days
of the Internet and the fact that many corporations had not yet appreciated how
commercially valuable and important it would be to them to register domain
names corresponding to their commercial trademarks. See infra notes 193-98
and accompanying text. On the other hand, the scenario might be classified as
a First Amendment case because the registrant was a journalist writing a story
about Internet domain names and their commercial value. See infra note 199
and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., infra Parts IV.D.1, IV.D.3 (discussing the delta.com and
clue.com situations as examples of competing legitimate interests in the same
domain name).
98. See infra Part IV.E.1.
99. See infra Part IV.E.2.
100. See infra Part IV.E.3.
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there may be little data in records of existing arbitrations and
litigation, at least in comparison to the other classes of disputes
identified above. This category of disputes contemplates some of the
issues recently addressed by Professor Chander in terms of the
failure of the current system to take into account cultural and often
noncommercial interests in domain names such as geographical
place names or culturally significant words and phrases.'O WIPO
made some suggestions on future developments in
has also recently
02
this area.1
This list of dispute classes is not necessarily exhaustive,
although it does capture the essence of the kind of classification
scheme that could be developed for domain name disputes in order
to ensure that Internet regulation does more than just protect
commercial trademark interests. There are several classes of
disputes that are not included here. In particular, certain types of
disputes have been intentionally omitted from this categorization
because they do not necessarily add anything to the points being
made here about the need to create a more nuanced approach to
domain name disputes outside the protection of trademark interests
against bad-faith cybersquatters.
One category omitted above includes those disputes involving a
deliberate misspelling of a trademark or a person's name in a
registered domain name. If, for example, a person wanted to
confuse the customers of Microsoft Corporation, in the trademark
sense of "confusion," she might register a deliberate misspelling of
microsoft.com, such as microsfot.com, in the hope of attracting
customers to a competing Web site or in order to make commentary
about, or parody of, the activities of Microsoft."' These kinds of
cases do not add much to the above classification scheme because
deliberate misspelling situations can arise within all of these
classifications as a subset of the behavior under consideration. The
101. Chander, supranote 9, at 718.
102. Report of the Second World Intellectual Property Organization Internet
Domain Name Process, The Recognition of Rights and the Use of Names in the
107-08, 127 (Sept. 3, 2001), at
Internet Domain Name System,

[hereinafter
http://arbiter.wipo.int/processes/process2/report/pdffreport.pdf
Second WIPO Report] (discussing geographical place names and the names of
indigenous people).
103. In fact, a company called Zero Micro Software did, at one stage, register
the domain name microsOft.com (with a zero in place of the second "o"), but the
registration was suspended after Microsoft filed a protest with. the registering
authority. The domain name was ultimately abandoned for nonpayment of fees
and was later registered to someone else. Bitlaw: A Resource on Technology
Law, Domain Name Disputes (2000), at http://www.bitlaw.com/internet/domain.
html (last visited Nov. 22, 2005) [hereinafter Bitlaw]. At the time of this
writing, the micros0ft.com name is still registered, but the Web site only
contains some random alpha-numeric characters on a blank background. See
http://www.microsOft.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2005).
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deliberate misspelling approach is just another way to achieve any
of the ends identified within each of the above classifications.
Examples include confusing customers as to the source or origin of
goods or services, making commentary or parody about an existing
trademark holder, confusing consumers about whether a celebrity or
politician has endorsed product lines available on a Web site or
otherwise making comments about such a person, and confusing
04

people about the political message of a particular politician.
Another kind of domain name dispute purposely omitted from
the above discussion is that which relates to the unauthorized use of
a trademark or personal name, or a deliberate misspelling of a
trademark or personal name, in the broader URL of a Web site. In
these cases, the disputed appellation is not the registered domain
name of the relevant Web site per se, but rather appears in
conjunction with the domain name as part of the Web site's URL.

An example is www.compupix.com/ballysucks, which was the
subject of litigation in the case of Bally Total Fitness Holding

Corporation v. Faber.' The problem in that case was not that the
registrant had registered a domain name corresponding to the
plaintiffs registered trademark. If he had done so, the domain
name would have looked something like bally.comr°6 or perhaps
ballysucks.com. °7 Rather, the litigation involved a domain name
that did not correspond to the plaintiffs trademark, compupix.com,
but that happened to reference a sub-page on the relevant Web site
that criticized Bally's operations and that appeared under the
composite URL described above.'0 8
104. If a label is needed for these kinds of situations, it would be possible to
describe them as "typo-squatting" situations. Typo-squatting could occur within
any of the categories described above as a subcategory of that particular class of
dispute. I am indebted to Professor Chander for suggesting this term.
105. 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1162 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
106. This domain name is actually registered to Bally Shoe Factories Ltd.
See Bally Shoe Factories Ltd., at http://www.bally.com (last visited Nov. 22,
2005).
107. In this context, it is worth noting the recent WIPO arbitration in
Societ6 Air France v. Virtual Dates, Inc, Case No. D2005-0168 (WIPO Arb. and

Mediation Ctr., Admin. Panel Decision, May 24, 2005) (Wallberg, Le Stanc, &
Samuel, Arbs.), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/ 2005/d20050168.html. This dispute involved a complaint by Air France against the
registration of the domain name airfrancesucks.com. See infra Part IV.C.4.

108. Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d. at 1162. As a matter of interest, as of the date of
this writing, the defendant in Bally appeared to have succeeded in convincing
the district court that the use of Bally's trademark within the URL, with
reference to Web content critical of Bally Total Fitness on the relevant Web site,
was not a trademark infringement under the Lanham Act. Id. at 1163-64.
However, the disputed sub-page of the Web site has since been removed from
www.compupix.com. This Web site predominantly contains adult-oriented
photography of male figures aimed at the homosexual community. See http:ll
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These disputes are not discussed here because they do not
relate to rights in domain names per se but, rather, to uses of Web
pages and URLs that incorporate commercially valuable trademarks
without authorization.
Important Internet-age applications of
trademark laws arise in these cases, but they do not directly bear on
a consideration of the extent to which the domain name system per
se might be expanded in scope to better accommodate competing
interests in domain names.
This discussion also does not deal with the area of disputes
involving metatags and Internet search engines as they may
implicate trademark law.109 This has been an emerging area of
American trademark jurisprudence in recent years because of the
development of various practices with respect to search engine
technology. In the early days of this technology, many search
engines utilized metatags to find Web pages for listing in response
to an Internet search. 10 Web site operators could insert these
metatags into their Web page structures in order for the search
engines to pick them up and prioritize them among search results."'
Sometimes, a Web site operator might use a competitor's domain
name or trademark as a metatag on its own site, causing its Web
page to be more prominently displayed in search results and thereby
allowing it to attract customers away from the competitor." 2 For
example, a software manufacturer in competition with Microsoft
Corporation could use the microsoft.com domain name or,
alternatively, the word "microsoft" itself not as a domain name, but
as a metatag on its own Web site, in the hope that its Web site
would be prioritized in an Internet search for the word "microsoft.""3
www.compupix.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2005). It also contains photographs of
flowers and landscapes. See http://www.compupix.com.fl (last visited on Nov.
22, 2005).
109. See Brookfield Communications v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d
1036 (9th Cir. 1999) (adjudicating a complaint in which the defendant used the
plaintiffs domain name in the defendant's metatags to draw customers to its
Web site); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Terri Welles, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (S.D.
Cal. 1999), affd in part and rev'd in part 279 F.3d 796, 807 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding that the defendant was entitled to use the Playboy trademark in
metatag for the defendant's Web site to enable potential customers to locate the
Web site more easily).
110. Playboy Enters. Inc., v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d
1020, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004) (Berzon, J., concurring); see also Julie A. Rajzer,
Note, Misunderstanding the Internet: How Courts are Overprotecting
Trademarks used in Metatags, 2001 L. REV. MICH. ST. U., DETROIT C.L. 427,
428-39 (2001) (discussing the history of metatags through an analysis of domain
name disputes and competition).
111. Rajzer, supra note 110, at 438.
112. Id. at 439.
113. This is, perhaps, not the best example because most people looking for
the Microsoft Corporation Web site would guess that its domain name was
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More problematic in recent years have been deals between
advertisers and search engine operators to prioritize certain Web
pages in search results in return for valuable consideration."' Thus,
organizations with lesser-known trademarks and domain names
may be at a disadvantage in terms of search engine results if they do
not pay search engine operators to have their pages prioritized when
a user enters certain relevant search terms. These disputes are very
interesting and raise new issues for trademark law in particular.
However, they also do not directly involve considerations about
reworking the domain name system in the manner proposed here.
Finally, the following discussion considers each of the categories
of disputes identified above in isolation from the other categories,
despite the fact that disputes involving more than two parties may
involve more than one category. An example of such a case would be
a tripartite dispute involving a legitimate trademark holder, a badfaith cybersquatter, and an individual whose personal name
happened to correspond to the domain name in question. This
dispute would clearly evidence an overlap of the "classic"
cybersquatting category with the personal name category. In fact,
even a bipartite dispute between a corporation and an individual
relating to the use of a domain name that happens to correspond to
both a personal name and a trademark might evidence such an
overlap.
This Article does not try to establish priority rules for such
cases. What is suggested, instead, is that alternative approaches to
remedial measures may be developed that might lessen the need for
developing priority rules between classes of disputes. Domain name
sharing, for example, is a strategy discussed below that might
encourage people and groups with different interests in the same
domain name to share a home page containing links to their
individual Web sites.1 ' Thus, the focus in many situations could be
on achieving ways of cooperatively sharing domain names, rather
than on deciding who has a "better" right to a particular Internet
domain name.
B.

"Classic"Cybersquatting

"Classic" cybersquatting, as contemplated here, is the practice
of registering one or more domain names with the intention of
microsoft.com and simply type the domain name into the URL bar of the Web
browser without using a search engine at all. However, less well-known
trademarks and domain names may be used in this way to the disadvantage of
the trademark holder.
114. Playboy Enters. Inc., v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp.
2d 1070, 1072 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
115. See infra Part IV.D.4.

1388

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

selling them for a profit to someone who has a particular interest in
the domain name, most obviously the holder of a registered
trademark corresponding to the domain name. As noted above, one
of the earliest and most prominent examples of this involved the
activities of Dennis Toeppen, who registered over one hundred
domain names corresponding to well-known trademarks."6 In the
early days of electronic commerce, Toeppen foresaw how valuable
these domain names could become before many of the big
corporations recognized their potential." 7 He sought payment from
the relevant corporations for transfer of the domain names to
Toeppen was subsequently sued by a number of
them. "
corporations on trademark infringement grounds for transfer of the
relevant domain names to the "rightful" holders." 9
One of the better known cases against Toeppen was the
litigation involving the panavision.com domain name, in which
Panavision International brought proceedings against Toeppen
under the pre-ACPA domestic trademark law.' This case was of
particular interest, in that it was unclear at the time precisely how,
or whether, traditional trademark law would, or should, deal with
Ultimately the court in the
such cybersquatting activities.
Panavision case, as in121most other similar litigation, held in favor of
the trademark holder.

This dispute arose when Toeppen asked Panavision to pay him
$13,000 in return for a transfer of the panavision.com domain name
to them, along with a promise that Toeppen would not acquire any
other Internet domain names alleged by Panavision to belong to
them. 122 Toeppen did not include any content on his panavision.com
Web site to suggest that he had any connection with Panavision, nor
did he pass off any of the Web site contents as belonging to, or
otherwise being authorized by, Panavision. 123 In fact, he included
only photographs of aerial views of the town of Pana, Illinois.
After Panavision refused to pay Toeppen the $13,000, Toeppen
116. These included domain names corresponding to trademarks owned by
Delta Air Lines, Neimen Marcus, Eddie Bauer, Lufthansa, American Standard,
and U.S. Steel. PanavisionII, 141 F.3d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1998).
117. See Panavision1, 938 F. Supp 616, 619 (C.D. Cal. 1996), affd 141 F.3d
1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. PanavisionII, 141 F.3d at 1319.
121. Id. at 1327 (holding that Toeppen's actions were aimed at Panavision
with an intent to extort and, thus, were a clear violation of the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1725(c) (2000), and the California
antidilution statute).
122. Id. at 1319.
123. PanavisionI, 938 F. Supp. at 619.
124. Id.
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registered a domain name corresponding to another Panavision
trademark, panaflex.com.'2'26 The only content on the relevant Web
page was the word "Hello.'
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had little trouble in holding
that Toeppen had committed a trademark infringement by diluting
Panavision's trademarks.'27 Judge Thompson noted that, in his
view, a domain name is more than just an "address."'28 It has the
significant purpose of identifying the entity that owns the relevant
Web site.'29 In response to Toeppen's argument that his conduct did
not prevent Panavision from registering some other domain name
and using its registered trademarks within the relevant Web site,
the court noted that using a company's trademark as its domain
name is the easiest way to locate a company's Web site.' ° Relying
on a search engine could turn up hundreds of Web sites 12 ' and the
plaintiffs Web site would not necessarily be prioritized in the search
results. The court was concerned that Panavision could lose
customers if people were forced to wade through multiple Web sites
produced by search engines rather than being able to type the
intuitive panavision.com into their
Web browser to take them
• 132
directly to the Panavision Web site. As noted above, the court also
seemed concerned with the immorality of Toeppen's conduct
generally and found that the attempt to sell the relevant domain
names to Panavision was a "commercial use," for the purposes of the
Lanham Act.' 33
Presumably, if the Toeppen situation arose today, under the
UDRP, Toeppen would be ordered to transfer the relevant domain
names to Panavision and, indeed, to other corporations in a similar
position, on the basis that: (a) his domain names were identical or
confusingly similar to trademarks held by other entities; (b) he had
125. PanavisionII, 141 F.3d at 1319.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1327. "Dilution" is defined as "the lessening of the capacity of a
famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the
presence or absence of-(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark
and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception." 15
U.S.C. § 1127 (2003). The Trademark Dilution Act provides a cause of action
for a party injured by dilution. Id. § 1125(c).
128. Panavision11, 141 F.3d at 1327.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1326-27.
131. Id. at 1327. In today's marketplace, search engines can turn up
thousands or millions of Web sites in search results as compared with the
potential "hundreds" of search results referred to in the Panavision judgment.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1325-26. See also Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227,
1239 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (making similar observations that Toeppen's
cybersquatting conduct amounted to a "commercial use" of the relevant mark
for the purposes of trademark law).
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no rights or legitimate interests with respect to the domain names;4
bad faith.1
and (c) he registered and used the domain names in
Under the provisions of the ACPA, a similar result would likely be
achieved. In addition to the above rationale, a court applying the
ACPA would be encouraged to take into account, as bad-faith
factors, Toeppen's pattern of registering multiple domain names
that he knew were identical or confusingly similar to the
trademarks of others,'35 and the fact that he offered to sell the
domain names to relevant trademark owners for a profit. 136 The
application of these rules is hardly surprising given that both the
UDRP and the ACPA were drafted specifically to combat conduct
such as Toeppen's.'3 7
What is interesting about the way in which these laws and
policies have developed in the wake of early domain
name/trademark cases is the fact that those early cases clearly set
the stage for the presumption that trademark protection would be a
paramount concern in cyberspace. Despite the very real concerns of
the plaintiffs in Panavision and other similar cases, the question
remains whether trademark law was the appropriate vehicle for
dealing with the plaintiffs' problems. As noted above, Toeppen was
not using the plaintiffs trademarks in Panavision in a traditional
manner of infringement, and he makes quite compelling arguments
that his activities did not prevent the plaintiff from using their
marks online, nor did they confuse customers as to the source of
goods or services. 3 8 Additionally, not all jurisdictions subscribe to
the "infringement by way of trademark dilution" doctrine that is
prevalent in the United States. 39 Thus, the result in the Panavision
litigation may have been difficult to replicate under domestic
trademark laws in some other jurisdictions. This is where the
UDRP has come in handy for trademark holders on a more global
scale.
The legacy of cases like Panavision was that the subsequent
development of the domain name system proceeded with trademark
134. See UDRP, supra note 3, § 4(a).
135. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VIII) (2003).
136. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VI).
137. Final Report of the First World Intellectual Property Organization
Internet Domain Name Process, The Management of Internet Names and
Addresses: Intellectual PropertyIssues, Executive Summary, I v (Apr. 30, 1999),
at http://www.icann.org/wipo/FinalReportl.html [hereinafter First WIPO
Report]; S. REP. No. 106-140, at 4 (1999).
138. PanavisionH, 141 F.3d at 1324-27.
139. See, e.g., Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003)
(applying a "disparagement of an ethnic group" doctrine); Buca, Inc. v.
Gambucci's, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (D. Kan. 1998) (applying an "infringement
of trade dress" doctrine).
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concerns at the forefront, and the remedies for domain name
disputes were developed on the basis of trademark considerations.
This may be too narrow a view of the domain name system for the
twenty-first century, as the following case studies demonstrate.
Obviously, the existence of the UDRP and the ACPA does not
necessarily prevent other policies and regulations from developing
with respect to domain names where a trademark interest is not the
only concern in a particular dispute. However, the presumption has
now arguably been created that trademarks are of paramount
importance in the domain name regulation area, particularly in the
".com" space. Thus, other interests created in the future-for
instance, in personal names or cultural identifiers-are likely to be
subservient to trademark considerations. 4 °
The Internet is an unparalleled communications medium in
terms of speed and scope. The domain name system was not
originally developed with electronic commerce in mind, although the
rise of electronic commerce has been unprecedented and the medium
is clearly very well suited to such transactions.' However, it is not
clear that the global information society has truly asked, or
answered, questions as to how we want the domain name system to
operate and how we want to prioritize the allocation of domain
names. Obviously, in the early days of the system, the idea behind
the domain name registration system was "first come, first
served." 4 2 There was clearly no preconception that corporate
entities with valuable trademarks would have "better" rights in
domain names, at least until the litigation started to occur. Thus,
there is a possibility that trademark holders have, to some extent,
"hijacked" the domain name system through reliance on trademark
rights to powerfully influence the development of domain name
policy and to encourage the evolution of legal and regulatory
mechanisms skewed toward protection of trademarks.
This is not to say that such developments are necessarily
illegitimate or wrong but, rather, that they occurred without
sufficient thought as to the nature and future of the domain name
system. In particular, the question was not asked whether domain
names should be allowed to influence the development of trademark
policy, or vice versa. In some ways, this parallels the way in which
the copyright system was incrementally altered by judicial decisions,
leading to pressure for amendments to copyright legislation, in order
to meet the needs of software producers and other digital content

199-201.
140. Second WIPO Report, supra note 102,
141. First WIPO Report, supra note 137, 10.
142. E.g., New Generic Top-Level Domains,supra note 5,

13.
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These legal developments were in response to very
industries.
real needs of corporate entities. However, in developing relevant
laws and policies, insufficient time may have been taken in order to
examine closely the extent to which copyright policy should be
influenced by new forms of information technology.
The following discussion questions the suitability of the
ACPA/UDRP approach for various kinds of disputes. It suggests
that, while the ACPA and the UDRP may be well suited to
traditional bad-faith cybersquatting activities, a broader approach
to domain name disputes needs to be developed for other classes of
disputes. In particular, it is important to recognize that many
domain name disputes are not about protecting a registered
trademark holder against a bad-faith cybersquatter.
C.

"Noncommercial"Cybersquatting
A set of domain name disputes that is particularly problematic
under the current system incorporates activities that may be
described as cybersquatting because they involve the registration of
a domain name that corresponds with someone else's trademark.
However, in this class of cases there is no clear or overriding intent
to make a commercial profit directly from attempting to sell the
name to the relevant trademark holder. There are many and varied
reasons why a person would engage in such conduct. For instance,
she may want to register a domain name corresponding to someone
else's trademark to make comments about the entity with the
registered mark, such as to criticize or parody that entity's
activities. Examples of these kinds of motivations are evident in the
cases of Planned Parenthood Federation of America v. Bucci,'44
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. 4 6Doughney,11
and, more recently, Bosley Medical Institute v. Kremer.1
1.
Planned Parenthood Federation of America v. Bucci
Planned Parenthood Federationof America v. Bucci involved a
Web site registrant using a domain name derived from another
entity's registered service mark, "Planned Parenthood," in an
attempt to present messages critical of the plaintiffs activities and
point of view. 147 The plaintiff was a nonprofit organization that
143. See, e.g., Semi-conductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C.
§§ 901-914 (2000); Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C.
§§ 1201-1205 (2000).
144. 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430, 1433 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), affd, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir.
1998).
145. 263 F.3d 359, 363 (4th Cir. 2001).
146. 403 F.3d 672, 674-75 (9th Cir. 2005).
147. PlannedParenthood,42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1432-33.
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provided "resources regarding sexual and reproductive health,
contraception and family planning, pregnancy, sexually transmitted
diseases, and abortion." 148 At the time of the litigation, it was
4
operating its Web site under the domain name ppfa.org.19 The
defendant, host of a Catholic radio program, was very critical of the
5
stance the plaintiff took on abortion and contraception.' " He
registered the plannedparenthood.com domain name in order to
attract Internet users who might be pro-abortion or otherwise think
they were accessing the plaintiffs Web site.'5 ' The domain name
was then used in an attempt to provide anti-abortion and related
information to those people.'
This is obviously not a clear cut case of using a domain name
corresponding to someone else's trademark to directly criticize the
trademark holder or her activities. The defendant's conduct here
was a little more oblique, in that it had the potential to confuse
Internet users looking for the plaintiffs Web site as to the source of
the information on www.plannedparenthood.com. Furthermore, the
defendant did other things to facilitate confusion, such as including
the text "Welcome to the PLANNED PARENTHOOD HOME
PAGE!" prominently on the Web site.' 53 Thus, the defendant
apparently attempted to pass off his views on abortion as those of
the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, and he used the
domain name to attract Internet users potentially sympathetic to
Planned Parenthood's activities in order to provide information
contradictory to the organization's views.
In terms of cybersquatting, this was also not a case of a badfaith registration of a domain name to extort money from the
"rightful" owner of the mark, unlike the Toeppen-style, "classic"
cybersquatting scenarios. Here, the defendant did not want to sell
the domain name to the Planned Parenthood organization. He
name himself for his own commentary on
wanted to use the domain
4
various social issues.1
Ultimately, he was held liable for trademark infringement
under the pre-ACPA laws of the United States.155 This case raises a
number of similar concerns to those raised in the above discussion of
the Panavision case. In particular, it was not clear that the
defendant's activities were truly infringing the plaintiffs interests
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1432.
1433.
1432.
1433.
1437, 1441.
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in a traditional trademark-dilution sense. The court went to some
lengths to find the requisite commercial uses of the trademarks by
the plaintiff and defendant to support trademark infringement
proceedings under the pre-ACPA Lanham Act. 156 Unlike the
Panavisionlitigation, however, the court could not base commercial
use on the defendant's attempt to sell the domain name to the
plaintiff because the defendant had no such intention. 157 However,
the court found that the commercial use requirement was satisfied
for a number of reasons, including the fact that any activities on a
Web page are likely to be "in commerce" because audiences of any
Web page that are widely dispersed geographically will be using
national or international telephone lines to access relevant
material.'58 Additionally, the defendant was interfering with the
plaintiffs ability to provide services in forty-eight states and over
the Internet, which, according to the court, must satisfy the "in
commerce" requirements of the Lanham Act. 9
Again, as with Panavision,if this litigation were decided under
the ACPA, it would, presumably, be a clear case of infringement.
Under the ACPA, when applying the bad-faith factors, the court
would likely have taken into account the defendant's
intent to divert consumers from the [service] mark owner's
online location to a site accessible under the domain name that
could harm the goodwill represented by the mark ... with the

intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a
likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation
or endorsement of the [Web] site."8
This case is, perhaps, another good example of a hard case
making bad law and ultimately leading to bad remedial legislation.
Like Panavision,it is questionable whether trademark law was the
right paradigm to apply here, even if one accepts that the
defendant's conduct was facially immoral. 16' The increasing use of
trademark law in these types of scenarios might skew both the
development of domain name policy and the traditionally accepted
policy basis of trademark law.
Nevertheless, the reason for
mentioning Planned Parenthoodhere is to show that cybersquatting
156. Id. at 1434-37.
157. Id. at 1433.
158. Id. at 1434.
159. Id.
160. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V) (2000).
161. Compared to the Panavisionsituation, the defendant here was at least
arguably trying to provide a social service to the community, by promulgating
an alternative point of view to the plaintiffs information, although he went
about it in a morally questionable manner. See Planned Parenthood, 42
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1433.
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can occur for purposes other than an intention to profit from selling
the domain name to a person with a corresponding registered
trademark interest. The ACPA groups these situations together
under the bad-faith factors. However, it may be more effective to
tease out the different kinds of motivations for cybersquatting and
to treat them differently if they are not all truly about commercial
profit. If we are going to protect more interests online than
commercial trademark interests, a more sophisticated approach to
domain name disputes should be developed.
Consider, for example, a case in which someone wanted to
register a domain name like plannedparenthood.com and make it
clear that they were not endorsed by the Planned Parenthood
Federation of America, but were using the site to criticize Planned
Parenthood's ideas and activities.
In the Planned Parenthood
litigation, the court assumed that, even if the defendant had
included a disclaimer on his Web site making it clear that his Web
site was not endorsed by the plaintiff, there would still have been a
trademark infringement.1 62 This finding was made on a basis
similar to the argument accepted in Panavision that a domain name
is more than a mark; it is a home page address that serves as an
external label to direct Internet users to a Web site. The court
suggested that it would be trademark infringement to register a
domain name corresponding to another person's trademark and to
criticize that person's activities, even with a disclaimer making it
clear that there was no endorsement to do so. 63
However, it is not clear that this argument is necessarily borne
out. The validity of this conclusion depends on whether we view the
social function of the domain name system as being predominantly a
means of facilitating commercial trademark interests or whether we
wish to promote other interests that may include criticism or
parody'64 of the activities of a given trademark holder. Even if the
aim is to promote online commerce, it is not clear that cases like
PlannedParenthoodare really about protecting online commerce, at
least in the context of traditional trademark policy.
2.

People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney

Other situations have arisen involving activities that may be
classed as cybersquatting in the technical sense, but where the
purpose is not to sell the relevant domain name to a corresponding
trademark holder for commercial profit. In People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Doughney, the defendant registered
162. Id. at 1441.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1439-40.
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the domain name peta.org, which corresponded to the plaintiffs
commonly used acronym and service mark, PETA. 165 The defendant
used the domain name to create a Web site called "People Eating
Tasty Animals."166 In his defense, he claimed that the Web site was
a parody of the plaintiffs organization and activities.16' He did not
pass off his site as being endorsed by the plaintiff, and the Web site
"contained links to various meat, fur, leather, hunting, animal
research, and other organizations."'6 8 The defendant did not offer to
sell the domain name to the plaintiff, although, when asked by the
plaintiff to transfer the name, he refused and later commented that,
if PETA wanted one of his domain names, they should make him an
offer. 169
The defendant was ultimately found liable for service-mark
infringement and for violating the ACPA, and the domain name was
transferred to the plaintiff.170 He was unsuccessful in arguing that
he did not intend to make a financial profit from registering the
domain name, as is necessary in a defense under the ACPA, because
he had publicly commented that PETA could make him an offer for
the domain name if they wanted it.' 7 ' Further, the court held that
several of the ACPA's bad-faith factors clearly covered the situation
at hand. 72 The court particularly noted that the defendant had no
legitimate interests in the mark and that he was purposely using
the mark to confuse people who might be searching for the plaintiffs
Web site.'73 The court also took into account that the defendant had
registered other names in the past that corresponded to trademarks
and people's names and engaged in similar conduct; in terms of
setting up parody Web sites.7
Again, we might ask whether trademark law is really the
appropriate vehicle for these kinds of disputes or whether it is
actually quite a poor fit in these kinds of cases. No one would likely
argue that the defendant's conduct was particularly pleasant or
responsible. However, if we regard the Internet as an unparalleled
global communications medium, rather than a purely commercial
forum, should we not have better, more appropriately tailored rules
to deal with these kinds of situations? In this case, PETA was
arguably not really concerned with trademark infringement but,
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

263 F.3d 359, 362-63 (4th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 362.
Id. at 363.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 363-64, 367-69, 371.
Id. at 368.
Id. at 368-69.
Id. at 369.
Id.
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rather, with the message the defendant was advocating and the use
of a domain name that could be intuitively associated with the
organization. PETA was not really worried about its ability to use
its trademark or service mark in commerce, nor was it concerned
that the defendant was confusing consumers in the sense of
Relying on trademark
appropriating its potential customers.
legislation and the UDRP might ultimately damage the policy
paradigm underlying trademark law and may create results, with
respect to domain name disputes, that do not accord with developing
social values and expectations, in terms of the domain name system.
3.

Bosley Medical Institute, Inc. v. Kremer

In fact, the skewing of trademark policy seemed to be a matter
of concern to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the more recent
case of Bosley Medical Institute v. Kremer.175 This case raised a
factual situation somewhat similar to that in PETA, but the Ninth
Circuit took a different view to that taken by the Fourth Circuit in
PETA. Bosley involved a patient of the Bosley Medical Institute
setting up a "gripe site" to criticize the Institute's hair restoration
services. 176 The defendant Kremer registered the domain name
bosleymedical.com for his Web site, 177 despite the plaintiff's
registration of the "Bosley Medical" trademark. 178 The plaintiff
brought proceedings against Kremer under traditional trademark
law, as well as under the ACPA. 179 The basic trademark
infringement actions failed at both the district court level and on
appeal to the Ninth Circuit on the basis that the use of the plaintiffs
trademark in Kremer's domain name was "noncommercial" in the
trademark sense and was unlikely to cause any consumer
confusion. 8 ' However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's
summary judgment on the ACPA claim on the basis that the district
court erred in applying a "commercial use" requirement181to the ACPA
claim as well as to the trademark infringement claims.
In its analysis of the trademark infringement claims, the Ninth
Circuit rejected the PETA approach due to the fact that it would
place most critical consumer commentary of a plaintiffs activities
under the regulation of the Lanham Act. 82 In its conclusions on the

175. 403 F.3d 672, 674 (9th Cir. 2005).
176. Id. at 675.
177. Id. Kremer also registered www.bosleymedicalviolations.com, which
was not challenged by the plaintiff. Id.
178. Id. at 674.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 674, 679-80.
181. Id. at 681.
182. Id. at 679.
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basic trademark infringement claims, the Bosley court noted that:
Kremer is not Bosley's competitor; he is their critic. His use of
the Bosley mark is not in connection with a sale of goods or
services-it is in connection with the expression of his opinion
about Bosley's goods and services.
The dangers that the Lanham Act was designed to address
are simply not at issue in this case. The Lanham Act ... does
Any
not prohibit all unauthorized uses of a trademark ....

harm to Bosley arises not from a competitor's sale of a similar
product under Bosley's mark, but from Kremer's criticism of
their services. Bosley cannot use the Lanham Act either as a
shield from Kremer's criticism or as a sword to shut Kremer
Up. 183
These judicial comments evidence clear concern that some
recent cases have been going too far in their broad interpretation of
trademark laws in an attempt to protect trademarks against all
forms of undesirable corresponding domain name registrations, even
when the protection of traditional trademark interests is not
necessarily at stake. T4 Thus, the Bosley decision is obviously a step
in the right direction, with respect to concerns about blurring the
boundaries of traditional trademark law. However, that question
may now be moot, in light of the enactment of the ACPA and the
adoption by ICANN of the UDRP. Even the Bosley court left the
question of ACPA infringement open, noting that a successful ACPA
action does not necessarily require the satisfaction of a "commercial
use" requirement, and that it remains to be seen whether Bosley
could have established that Kremer registered the relevant domain
name in bad faith. 18 5 We can now only anticipate whether such

conduct might fall afoul of the ACPA without necessarily infringing
more traditional trademark rules. If this is the case, the question as
to whether the ACPA adds anything to traditional Lanham Act
liability for cybersquatting may finally be answered in the
8 6 Whether bad faith should be found in such cases as a
affirmative."
matter of policy is a more complex question.

183. Id. at 679-80.
184. Id. See also Hannibal Travis, The Battle for Mindshare: The Emerging
Consensus that the First Amendment Protects Corporate Criticism and Parody
on the Internet, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2005), at http://www.vjolt.net/voll0/
issuel/vl0il a3-Travis.pdf (suggesting that courts have found corresponding

domain names to violate trademark law, even when traditional trademark
principles are not involved).
185. Bosley, 403 F.3d at 681.
186. This is assuming, of course, that the Ninth Circuit decision is correct on
the trademark infringement issue.
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The Bosley litigation certainly raises some interesting questions
about the kinds of social values we might want to protect in a
domain name registration and dispute resolution system.
"Gripe sites," like that set up by the defendant in Bosley, raise
specific questions about the role of the domain name system and
domain name policy with respect to the balance between commercial
rights and interests and free speech interests. Certainly, there is a
social value in allowing people to have easy access to a forum to
complain about the activities of a commercial entity. However, the
question remains whether these people should be able to utilize a
domain name for that forum that somehow corresponds with a
trademark associated with the relevant entity.
On the one hand, the use of such a domain name is a certain
way of reaching a large audience with a message critical of the
business in question. If the person who wishes to complain about a
business is relegated to a "lesser" domain space, she might be
unable to attract the kind of audience that she wants to reach. On
the other hand, is there a social value in the expectation that a
".com" name, in particular, that corresponds to a trademark will
lead to a Web site affiliated with the trademark owner? Further,
there may be situations in which a relevant trademark owner does
not want to maintain a Web site or a Web presence. Should that
trademark owner then be forced to register one or more domain
names defensively and to maintain registration, in order to prevent
potential gripe sites from arising under a relevant domain name?
This Article suggests that it should not always be the case that a
trademark owner has the "best" rights in a corresponding domain
name, 187 but that conclusion still leaves unresolved difficult
questions as to where appropriate lines are to be drawn.
4.

airfrancesucks.com

These questions become even more difficult when one considers
slight variations of the facts in Bosley. A recent WIPO arbitration
dealing with the domain name airfrancesucks.com is a good case in
point.'8 8 The domain name here is not airfrance.com. In other
words, it is not a direct transcription to domain name form of a
However, it clearly incorporates the "Air
valuable trademark.
France" trademark in a prominent manner. This case involved a
complaint and commentary Web site on which visitors to the site

187. See discussion infra pp. 143-49.
188. Societ6 Air France v. Virtual Dates, Inc., Case No. D2005-0168 (WIPO
Arb. and Mediation Ctr., Admin. Panel Decision, May 24, 2005) (Wallberg,
Le Stanc, & Samuel, Arbs.), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/
2005/d2005-0168.html.
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were encouraged to register complaints about experiences they had
in flying with Air France. 89 The WIPO arbitration panel was split
as to whether the domain name should be transferred to the
complainant, Air France. 19
The majority panelists ultimately
ordered transfer of the name to Air France on the bases that the
domain name was confusingly similar to the "Air France"
trademark, the registrant had no legitimate rights in the name, and
the registrant had registered the domain name in bad faith.191
However, a dissenting panelist felt that domain names utilizing a
trademark plus a pejorative word like "sucks" would not confuse
consumers about the source of information on the Web site.9
Perhaps a discussion of this case does not really belong in the
"noncommercial" cybersquatting category of disputes, as defined
above in Parts IV.A and IV.C, because it is arguably not a
cybersquatting dispute like the ones litigated in the previous cases,
which involved domain names that directly corresponded to a
trademark without any additional pejorative words. It may be that
the addition of a pejorative term like "sucks" at the end of a domain
name could answer the "social values" question raised within Part
IV.C.3. Perhaps the best balance of social interests would be
achieved by allowing gripe site operators to utilize a "sucks" version
of a name and preventing them from using a domain name that
identically corresponds with a relevant mark. Under this scenario,
a gripe site could be operated under airfrancesucks.com, but not
under airfrance.com. However, this does not deal with the problem
that the ability to use an identically corresponding domain name
like airfrance.com or bosleymedical.com will probably attract a
larger audience than relegating people who wish to complain about
a business to a gripe-site suffix like "sucks." It also does not deal
with the problem of uses of domain name suffixes that are not
clearly pejorative. What would have happened, for example, if the
respondent in the Air France case had utilized a domain name like
www.airfrancetickets.com for its gripe site?
There is certainly much more work to be done in the gripe-site
context in terms of examining previous disputes involving such sites
and the various permutations and combinations of domain names
that are utilized in this context, as well as the closeness of their
association with a given trademark. This Article does not aim to
definitively resolve the gripe-site question other than identifying
that both the policies behind trademark law-to avoid consumer

189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 5(B).
§§ 6-7, Dissent (Samuel, Arb., dissenting).
§§ 6-7.
at Dissent (Samuel, Arb., dissenting).
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confusion and, to some extent, to avoid dilution of famous marksand the importance of promoting free speech are competing social
values that should be protected in cyberspace. The question is,
particularly in relation to gTLDs like ".com," what should the
overriding policy choices be with respect to uses of domain names
corresponding to trademarks that are not operated by direct
commercial competitors to the trademark holder? It is important
that the international Internet community starts to consider these
questions in more detail and to separate the various permutations
and combinations of motivations for cybersquatting conduct outside
of the "classic," direct commercial profit motives.
5. mcdonalds.com
Moving away from the gripe-site context, one final example of a
cybersquatting case that did not involve a pure commercial profit
motive may well be of historical interest only, but it exemplifies
further how unexpected motivations may lead to the registration of
a domain name that corresponds with someone else's trademark. In
the early days of the Internet, a journalist from Wired magazine,
Joshua Quittner, realized that domain name registration was like
the western frontier, and that domain name prospectors, like
Toeppen, were snapping up domain names that large corporations
might later want to possess. 19' He noticed the lack of awareness by
large corporations of the Internet and the domain name system, as
well as the lack of careful scrutiny of registration applications by the
domain name registry in the early days of domain name
registration." Specifically, he spoke to the McDonald's Corporation
and asked a representative about the company's awareness of the
Internet and domain name registration issues, noting that
mcdonalds.com was not yet registered and also suggesting that
anyone could register it, including the McDonald's Corporation's
195
chief competitor at the time, the Burger King Corporation.
Ultimately, Quittner registered mcdonalds.com himself to make
this point. 196 He set up an e-mail address of ronald@mcdonalds.com
and solicited suggestions from people for what to do with the domain
name.'97 Ultimately, he agreed to transfer the domain name to
McDonald's in exchange for them making a contribution to

193. Joshua Quittner, Billions Registered, WIRED, Oct. 1994, at 50, available
at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.10/mcdonalds.html (last visited Nov.
22, 2005).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 56.
197. Id.; Bitlaw, supra note 103.
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charity. 19 Again, this is an example of an activity that we would
today categorize as cybersquatting. Presumably, under the UDRP
and the ACPA, this kind of conduct would fall afoul of the respective
bad-faith factors, because Quittner had no legitimate interest in the
domain name and did not use it for any legitimate purposes, unless
one considers raising public and corporate awareness of the
potential for trademark-infringing uses of Internet domain names a
legitimate purpose."'
It is true that Quittner did not intend to make a profit for
himself from registering the name, but he ultimately achieved a
commercial gain for a charity, so this conduct may still violate the
ACPA. The ACPA only requires that the defendant "has a bad-faith
intent to profit from that mark," and it does not define what "profit"
means in this context. 20 0 Given the fairly broad interpretations that
courts have generally made regarding trademark law, 20 1 and the
ACPA in particular, conduct such as Quittner's, carried out in
today's marketplace, might be blocked by this obstacle. In terms of
the bad-faith factors, Quittner, or someone engaging in conduct such
as his in today's market, might face problems due to the fact that
they would have no legitimate interests in the mark and they would
be usurping a domain name that "rightfully" belonged to someone
else.
It would, arguably, be similar to the position in which
Doughney found himself during the PETA litigation. 2
It is possible, however, that Quittner, engaging in similar
conduct today, could defend himself against a bad-faith finding
under the UDRP on the basis that: (a) he did not register the
domain name "primarily for the purpose of selling" it to McDonald's
for a profit;20 3 (b) he did not engage in a pattern of registering
domain names corresponding to well-known trademarks; 20 4 (c) he did
not register the domain name "primarily for the purpose of
disrupting the business" of McDonald's; 2 5 and (d) he did not attempt
to attract customers to his Web site by passing it off as being
sponsored or endorsed by McDonald's.2 6

198. Bitlaw, supra note 103.
199. See supra Part III.A-B.
200. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
201. See supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
202. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Doughney, 263
F.3d 359, 369 (4th Cir. 2001).
203. UDRP, supra note 3, § 4(b)(i).
204. See id. § 4(b)(ii).
205. Id. § 4(b)(iii). This proposition is perhaps questionable, although, at the
time, the McDonald's Corporation apparently had no plans for an Internet
presence, so, in that context, it might have been difficult to argue a purpose of
"disrupting the business." Id.
206. See id. § 4(b)(iv).
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This is a somewhat frivolous example because it is perhaps
unrealistic in this context to look at conduct that occurred in the
early days of the Internet when few people truly understood its
potential as a commercial medium, including the potential of
domain names to be valuable online commodities. On the other
hand, pre-ACPA and -UDRP situations may give us an idea of how
people originally perceived the domain name system, prior to the
rise of regulatory mechanisms that favored commercial trademark
interests. In any event, the Quittner situation is mentioned here
because it does highlight the fact that there may be unpredictable
reasons for which someone would want to register a domain name
corresponding to an unrelated, valuable trademark without an
intent to profit personally from, or to infringe upon, the trademark.
Thus, trademark law may have its limitations as a regulator of
online conduct involving domain name registration and use. In the
future, it is likely that the global Internet community will need to
look at these issues more closely. It may be that anticybersquatting
legislation and private dispute resolution mechanisms ultimately
will need to be reviewed in order to answer questions relating to the
potential impact of these systems on competing social interests.
These interests might include the ability of individuals to utilize
relevant domain names for purposes such as the criticism or parody
of a trademark holder.
At the very least, the "noncommercial" forms of cybersquatting
should be separated, as a matter of policy, from "classic,"
Toeppen-style cybersquatting in making these determinations.
"Classic" cybersquatting is clearly an easier case because no obvious
social or cultural interests are served by permitting this kind of
activity, and there is an arguably obvious "bad-faith" or profit
motive. °7 Most of the scenarios classified above as "noncommercial"
cybersquatting, however, potentially raise competing social interests
to those of the trademark holder, usually in the free speech area.2 8
Thus, the ability to promote some of these interests should be
addressed more precisely than is currently the case under existing
dispute resolution mechanisms.
It may be that the solution to this problem is to make better use
of differentiated gTLDs in this context. Perhaps there needs to be a
rule that the ".com" suffix should be reserved for trademark
interests, and that a new suffix should be introduced for use of
commentary and parody Web sites. The problem with this solution
is that it assumes that the possession of a trademark gives an entity
an automatic right to one or more corresponding ".com" level
207. See supra Part IV.B.
208. See supra Part TV.C.
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versions of its trademark, and it also assumes that those wishing to
comment on the entity holding that trademark should be relegated
to a "lesser" domain space. There has apparently been no conscious
regulatory decision that this rule should be implemented, and there
is no necessary policy reason why it should. Further, it is not clear
that trademark law is the appropriate vehicle to achieve this result,
even if it is accepted that commercial trademark interests should
take priority in the ".com" name space. Indeed, the court in Bosley
expressed its opinion that trademark law is not intended to prevent
all unauthorized uses of a trademark, even if such uses do occur
within a corresponding domain name.209
Further, the reason that people like Kremer register ".com"
level domain names for gripe sites is to draw attention to their
criticisms of the relevant commercial entity. If Kremer had been
relegated to a lesser form of the "Bosley" domain space, he would not
have achieved his desired purpose of publicly criticizing Bosley's
practices in a significantly large online forum. Again, the question
arises as to whether trademark law and policy is the appropriate
vehicle for regulating such conduct. In any event, the PETA case
involved a ".org" domain name."O Thus, even a rule that ".com"
names should be reserved to "rightful" trademark owners would not
solve the problem of commentary and parody sites utilizing other
important gTLDs such as ".org" and ".net." If there is to be a
presumption that all gTLDs corresponding to trademarks are to be
reserved for "rightful" trademark owners, whether or not those
trademark owners have bothered registering the names before
someone else, this edict should be the result of clear, and preferably
global, policy debate.2 ' It should not be an incidental result of the
overzealous application of trademark law and policy. Finally, an
approach that prefers trademark interests in corresponding ".com"
domain spaces cannot deal effectively with conflicts involving two or
more legitimate trademark holders with corresponding interests in
the same domain name.

209. Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2005).
210. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Doughney, 263
F.3d 359, 362 (4th Cir. 2001).
211. In fact, this has been the case with respect to some of the newer gTLDs

introduced in 2000. Policy decisions were made to allow legitimate trademark
holders and, in the case of the ".name" and ".pro" domain spaces, other
legitimate interest holders to have priority in registering relevant domain
names to avoid cybersquatting. The strategies for doing so are comprehensively
discussed and evaluated by WIPO in its report, New Generic Top-Level
Domains. See supra note 5, TT 95-107. However, these policies were never
implemented for the original gTLDs such as ".com," ".org," and ".net."
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D.

Contests between Multiple Legitimate Interests
Moving away from cases involving activity that might be
described as cybersquatting, another category of disputes in which
trademark principles might not provide the answers for determining
a contest between competing interests in a domain name is the
situation where two or more parties have competing "legitimate"
interests in the domain name. The obvious contest here is between
two or more parties who each hold trademark interests that
correspond to the same domain name. This is different from what
has been termed "cybersquatting" in the previous two categories,
largely because the key aim of the registrant here is not to claim a
particular domain name in the absence of a commercial trademark
interest therein with the knowledge that another entity has such an
interest corresponding to the name. Rather, the registrant itself has
a commercial trademark interest in the name, regardless of whether
she knows that another party may also have a competing trademark
interest in the name.
This can occur, for example, when the same or a similar mark
has been registered in the same jurisdiction, but with respect to
212
different goods or services.
Another example would be where a
respect to similar goods or
been registered
similar mark
servces
ut ihas
diferen
..... with213
The problem here arises
services but in different jurisdictions.
from the fact that domain names are unique, whereas multiple
similar trademarks may be registered at different trademark
registries, or at the same registry, but regarding different goods and
services. Thus, disputes over domain names can arise that national
trademark systems are ill-equipped to handle.
1.
delta.com
Obviously, it is possible for different versions of a similar
domain name to be registered: for example, microsoft.com, ms.com,
microsoftcomputing.com, microsoft.net, and microsoft.org. However,
as noted above, most businesses will want to register the domain
name that most obviously, generically, and intuitively leads people
to their Web site. Thus, businesses will prefer a ".com" level domain
name with wording that most clearly identifies their business.
Delta Air Lines, for example, will want to ensure that it can register

212. Similar trademarks can be registered for different goods and services
within one jurisdiction and even for similar goods and services in different
jurisdictions because of the national character of trademark registration
systems.
213. This occurred with ConAgra's "Healthy Choice" trademark, which was
registered in Australia independently of ConAgra's American operations. See
ConAgra Inc. v. McCain Foods (1992) 33 F.C.R. 302.
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214

delta.com, as well as the more convoluted deltaairlines.com.
This example also highlights the associated point that one
trademark holder can register more than one domain name." ' As
mentioned previously, the online retailer Amazon.com has
registered various country-code level versions of its domain name,
along with amazon.com and amazon.biz."' The idea of releasing
multiple new gTLDS was partly that various legitimate interest
holders could all have at least one version of a relevant domain
name. However, it does not appear to have worked out this way in
practice. The ".com" domain names are still the most highly
coveted, and nothing stops businesses with a legitimate interest in a
domain name from registering multiple versions of the name, as the
Delta Air Lines and Amazon.com examples illustrate.217
The delta.com name is actually a very good example of a set of
competing legitimate interests in the same ".com" domain name
corresponding to multiple registered trademarks. In recent years,
much litigation has been threatened and settlements ultimately
reached, with respect to the delta.com name.21 There were a
number of companies who wanted the name, each of whom managed
to register it for a particular period of time. 219 This included Delta

Air Lines, Delta Financial, and DeltaComm Internet Services ,22
each of which would appear to have a legitimate right to use the
name. The domain name was, in fact originally registered to
DeltaComm, who then sold it to Delta Financial when it could not
reach a satisfactory transfer agreement with Delta Air Lines.22'
Ultimately, Delta Air Lines obtained the domain name from Delta
Financial.22 2
This is a classic situation in which trademark law and current
214. As at the date of writing, Delta Air Lines currently has registered both
of these domain names. Network Solutions, WHOIS Record for delta.com, at

http://www.networksolutions.com/whois/results.jhtmljsessionid=3RCOA1HNOB
LM4CWKEAQCFEQ?whoistoken=O&imageKeyPage=/whois/entry.jhtml&_requ
estid=1338205 (last visited Nov. 22, 2005); Network Solutions, WHOIS Record
for deltaairlines.com, at http://www.networksolutions.com/whois/results.jhtmlj
sessionid=U2ZlO25ZJV2GYCWKEAQCFEQ?whoistoken=O&imageKeyPage=/w
hois/entry.jhtml&_requestid=1339053 (last visited Nov. 22, 2005).
215.

See New Generic Top-Level Domains, supra note 5,

21.

216. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
217.

See New Generic Top-Level Domains, supra note 5,

21 (suggesting

that a large number of trademark owners are likely to register their marks in
all possible gTLDs).
218. See Christopher Elliott, No Winner in Delta.com Deal, INSIDE
INTERACTIVE TRAVEL, Sept. 5, 2000, at http://www.elliott.orglinteractive/2000/
delta.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2005).
219. See id.

220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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domain name dispute resolution policies do not provide the answers
to some significant commercial problems. All of the trademarks
were validly registered, and all of the companies involved in the
domain name dispute had a legitimate claim to the name. 23 Each of
the companies, in fact, could have used a different gTLD version of
the domain name, such as delta.org or delta.biz, but the ".com" name
was perceived to be more valuable. Additionally, they could all have
used longer and more descriptive versions of the ".com" name, such
226
225
224
as deltaairlines.com, ' deltacomm.com, and deltafinancial.com.
27
In this vein, the Delta Faucet Company uses deltafaucet.com.
2.

roadrunner.com

Another example of a situation in which two or more entities
might have had a legitimate claim to the same domain name
involved the roadrunner.com domain name. This was a pre-ACPA
and -UDRP case, but it is illustrative of the point being made here.
The name roadrunner.com was originally registered to an Internet
access provider in New Mexico.228 Many companies in New Mexico
223. See, e.g., Bryce J. Maynard, The Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine and
Trademark Infringement on the Internet, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1303, 1334

(2000).

224. In fact, as noted above, at the time of writing, Delta Air Lines has also
registered this domain name along with delta-air.com. See supra note 214 and
accompanying text; Network Solutions, WHOIS Record for delta-air.com, at

http://www.networksolutions.com/whois/results.jhtmljsessionid=U2Z1O25ZJV 2
GYCWKEAQCFEQ?whoistoken=4&imageKeyPage=/whois/entry.jhtml&_reques
tid=1342310 (last visited Nov. 22, 2005). Interestingly, delta.org is registered to
the health benefits nonprofit Delta Dental Plans Association, while delta.net is
registered to an online services company called Delta Internet Services.
Network Solutions,

WHOIS Record for delta.org, at http://www.network

solutions.com/whois/results.jhtml;jsessionid=U2Z1025ZJV2GYCWKEAQCFEQ
(last
?whoistoken=9&imageKeyPage=/whois/entry.jhtml&_requestid=1342720
visited Nov. 22, 2005); Network Solutions, WHOIS Record for delta.net, at

http://www.networksolutions.com/whois/results.jhtmljsessionid=U2Z1025ZJV 2
GYCWKEAQCFEQ?whoistoken=13&imageKeyPage=/whois/entry.jhtml&_requ
estid=1342946 (last visited Nov. 22, 2005).
225. At the time of writing, this domain name, along with delta.biz, is
registered to the internet services company Tucows, Inc., which is effectively a
corporate successor to DeltaComm Internet Services. Network Solutions,
WHOIS Record for deltacomm.com, at http://www.networksolutions.com/whois/

results.jhtmljsessionid=U2Z1O25ZJV2GYCWKEAQCFEQ?whoistoken=18&im
ageKeyPage=/whois/entry.jhtml&_requestid=1343330 (last visited Nov. 22,
2005); Network Solutions, WHOIS Record for delta.biz, at http://www.network

solutions.com/whois/results.jhtmljsessionid=U2Z1O25ZJV2GYCWKEAQCFEQ
(last
?whoistoken=6&imageKeyPage=/whois/entry.jhtml&_requestid=1342465
visited Nov. 22, 2005).
226. At the time of writing, Delta Financial is using the deltafinancial.com
domain name. See http://deltafinancial.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2005).
227. See http//www.deltafaucet.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2005).
228. See Bitlaw, supra note 103.
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are named after the Roadrunner bird because it is the state bird of
New Mexico, 229 and any number of them could plausibly assert rights
to the roadrunner.com domain name. 230
Warner Bros.
Entertainment Group disputed the registration of the domain name
by a New Mexico company on the basis of the name's relationship
with its popular "Road Runner" cartoon character.231 Network
Solutions, Inc., the company responsible for registration of ".com"
domain names at the time, threatened to suspend the registration of
this domain name on the basis of complaints from Warner Bros., so
the New Mexico company sued Network Solutions to prevent the
suspension. 232 Although suspension was prevented, the domain
name was eventually obtained by a joint venture company involving
Time
Warner,
MediaOne,
Microsoft,
Compaq,
and
Advance/Newhouse.232
Again, we see a poor fit between standard trademark law
principles and the Internet domain name system.
Even as
augmented by the UDRP and the ACPA, this dispute would have
been difficult to resolve, as the competing interests all appeared to
be legitimate. Thus, it would have been hard to establish any badfaith factors to justify an order to transfer the name to the
complainant Warner Bros. This may simply mean that a "firstcome, first-served" rule should apply to such disputes and that
market forces will sort out who has the better interest in a domain
name, in terms of who is prepared to pay the most for a transfer of
the name. However, such an approach will likely favor rich and
powerful corporations over smaller businesses, which have fewer
resources either to fend off litigation or to pay high market prices for
desired domain names.
There may be nothing wrong with this result as a matter of
policy. In fact, there may be social value in allowing the wealthiest
corporate entity to hold the most intuitive version of a particular
domain name. If it is assumed that, among competing parties, the
corporation with the greater resources to secure the domain name
229. New Mexico State Government, Fast Facts About NM, at http://www.
state.nm.us/category/aboutnm/fastfacts.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2005).
230. Oppedahl, supra note 1, at 441.
231. See Stephen Windhaus & Philip K. Akalp, Domain Names and
Trademarks, THE CORPORATE BEE, July 2003, at http://www.mycorporation.com/
newsletter/archives/July2003.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2005). It may be
questioned whether Warner Bros. had trademark rights in its cartoon
characters as opposed to just copyrights in the cartoons themselves. However,
the current www.roadrunner.com Web site certainly attempts to make a
distinctive trademark use of the character in the online services market. See
http://www.roadrunner.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2005).
232. Bitlaw, supra note 103.
233. Id.
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also has a larger online customer base, then, perhaps, this result
makes sense, because a larger group of customers is less
inconvenienced in searching for the entity in question. However,
once again, this possibility has never been consciously debated as a
matter of global Internet policy.
Furthermore, there may also be distinct social value in
promoting the activities of less wealthy entities online because of
the potential of the Internet to enable such entities to develop in a
more expansive way than they could manage in the purely physical
world. While large corporate entities may have an advantage in the
physical world, promoting smaller entities' interests online may
create business opportunities that would not otherwise exist for
these entities and thereby serve values relating to the
diversification of business activity and consumer choice online. In
fact, one way to assist both larger and smaller online entities and to
promote both sets of social values online would be domain name
sharing arrangements.2 Under such arrangements, one or more
entities could share, for instance, the ".com" version of the same
domain name on a shared Web page, which would, in turn, contain
hyperlinks to the different entities' respective Web sites.
3.

clue.com

One final example of a dispute involving multiple legitimate
interests in a single domain name involves the clue.com name. This
domain name was, during the course of the dispute, and is still, at
the time of writing, registered to Clue Computing, Inc.2"5 Clue
Computing is an information technology consulting company that
chose its corporate name without reference to the popular "CLUE"
board game that is manufactured by Hasbro, Inc.238 Hasbro has
registered the "CLUE" trademark with respect to the game. 37 In
litigation between Hasbro and Clue Computing, the founder of Clue
Computing noted that he and his partner had chosen the name for
their business in response to people referring to themselves as being
"clueless" about computers. Thus, the founders of Clue Computing
thought it would be clever to have a business whose name played on
the idea of giving clueless people a "clue." 38 As a result, much

234. See infra Part IV.D.4.
235. Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 117, 119 (D. Mass.
1999), affd, 232 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000). The Web site, www.clue.com, still
displays information about Clue Computing. See http://www.clue.com (last
visited Nov. 22, 2005).
236. Hasbro, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 119.
237. See U.S. Trademark No. 526,059 (registered Dec. 24, 1948), at http:/!
tess2.uspto.gov/bin/showfield?f=doc&state=8ne6gl.2.18.
238. Hasbro, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 119.
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litigation has ensued between Hasbro and Clue.23 9
To date, Hasbro has been unsuccessful in having the domain
name transferred to it on the basis of trademark infringement. 2 40
Hasbro has not been able to demonstrate, under the Lanham Act,
that Clue Computing is either• diluting
its trademark or causing any
241
significant consumer confusion.
Even under the ACPA or the
UDRP, it is unlikely that Hasbro could establish the requisite badfaith factors against Clue Computing, as Clue Computing does
appear to have a legitimate claim to the domain name. As noted
above, Hasbro, as the larger corporation, could always offer to pay
Clue Computing a significant amount for the domain name.
However, as the last significant action relating to this litigation took
place in the year 2000, 24 2 it would seem that Hasbro may have lost
interest in the domain name.
This may be an example demonstrating that the market
eventually sorts itself out with respect to many commercial conflicts
involving domain names with multiple potentially legitimate
commercial uses. It may also go some way towards alleviating the
concerns raised above with respect to the roadrunner.comname and,
to some extent, the delta.com name, that large corporations will
always win out in a market system because they can force the
smaller corporations into submission through costly litigation and
eventually out-pricing them for the desired domain name. However,
this may not be the best example to quell concerns about the
domination of larger commercial players in these kinds of conflicts.
Presumably, Hasbro does not have as significant an interest in the
clue.com domain name as Delta Air Lines has in delta.com, because
of the direct association of the domain name with Delta's corporate
identity.
Hasbro may even have a lesser interest in the clue.com name
than Warner Bros. has in the roadrunner.com domain name.
Although "Clue" is the name of a product distributed by Hasbro, and
"Road Runner" is the name of a cartoon character developed by
Warner Bros., there is likely a stronger association between Warner
Bros. cartoon characters and the Warner Bros. corporate identity
than between board games and their manufacturers.
The only
evidence that somewhat supports this proposition is the way in
which Warner Bros. arguably pursued the roadrunner.com domain
name more aggressively than Hasbro pursued clue.com. However,
239. For a summary of this litigation, see Clue Computing, Inc., Hasbro,Inc.
sues Clue Computing, Inc., at http://www.clue.com/legal/index.html (last
modified May 28, 2002).
240. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
241. Hasbro, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 124-26.
242. Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 232 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000).
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Warner Bros.' ultimate success and Hasbro's ultimate failure might,
instead, be a result of the fight that was put up by the respective
smaller corporations that possessed a competing interest in the
relevant domain names. Clue Computing may have taken a more
strident stance than the New Mexico Internet access provider, both
as a matter of principle and, perhaps, because they received more
financial and other support from outsiders. 43
This may support an argument that, in cases of legitimate
competing commercial interests in a domain name, the market will
sort itself out with little help necessary from any external legal or
regulatory system. Sometimes, the bigger corporation will win, and,
sometimes, it will lose. Regardless of the outcome, it is clear that
traditional trademark law and policy, as it is now augmented by the
UDRP and the ACPA, is not a good fit for these kinds of disputes. It
is also clear that little thought has been given to alternate methods
for dealing with these disputes outside of the policies based on
traditional trademark law as altered by the new laws. Certainly,
there have been no detailed national or global debates about the
kinds of social and commercial values that should be promoted in
these situations as a matter of policy.
4. Domain Name Sharing
Perhaps these kinds of disputes lend themselves to new
approaches. One potential solution would include entities with
competing legitimate interests in a domain name sharing that name
by a joint registration and then sharing a home page with
hyperlinks to individual Web sites of the respective interest holders.
Technically, this possibility is not particularly problematic. Thus, if
a government policy (or private ICANN policy) could be developed to
encourage this kind of activity as an alternative to litigation or
dispute resolution, society might benefit through greater
accessibility to all Web sites, with similar trademark identities
utilizing a mutual domain name as a portal to their respective Web
sites.
One way of encouraging this kind of activity would be for a
government agency or private body authorized by ICANN to
specialize in helping those prepared to share a domain name with
the technical aspects of setting up the shared main Web page with
hyperlinks to the respective entities' individual Web sites. This
could be a free service funded, in part, by domain name registration
fees, or it could be a service offered inexpensively by the relevant
243. Clue Computing made a specific call for financial support on their Web
site. See Clue Computing, supra note 239.
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agency or department as an alternative to more costly litigation or
dispute resolution.2 44
This approach might necessitate some revision to the UDRP, as
well as to the initial domain name registration licensing agreement,
in order to make it clear that the "first-come, first-served" rule will
not necessarily apply in a case of multiple competing legitimate
trademark interests corresponding to a domain name. Under the
scheme proposed here, domain name registration policy might have
to reflect the fact that, in cases of competing legitimate interests,
domain name sharing is to be mandated over permitting the first
registrant to maintain the name, in the absence of a showing of a
bad-faith registration under the UDRP or the ACPA by a
complainant. Otherwise, there would be no incentive for an initial
domain name registrant to participate in a domain name sharing
scheme, assuming that the registrant felt that she could successfully
deflect a UDRP complaint or an ACPA action on the basis of her
rightful ownership interest in a trademark corresponding to the
relevant domain name. Such a scheme would also likely require, for
applicants seeking a domain name sharing arrangement, a showing
of a good-faith interest corresponding to the relevant domain name.
There are a number of ways to set up this kind of a system. As
suggested above, domain name sharing could be incorporated into
the UDRP. Thus, if the initial registrant objected to sharing the
relevant domain name under a private arrangement, an arbitrator
or panel of arbitrators might determine whether to mandate a
domain name sharing arrangement.
Such arbitration would,
presumably, be instituted by the nonregistered party wishing to
share the name.
This is not as difficult as it might at first appear. During the
course of standard UDRP complaints, arbitrators already routinely
determine whether domain name registrants and complainants have
legitimate interests in a disputed domain name.245 It should not be
too imposing to ask those arbitrators to make similar
determinations in a different context. In other words, a new part of
the UDRP could be developed in order to empower arbitrators to
order a domain name sharing arrangement in the event that a
complainant shows a legitimate interest in a domain name in which
the original domain name registrant also has a legitimate interest.
Such a system might also allow for a complainant to argue, in the
alternative, both for a transfer of the domain name, if the original

244. Thus, any fee charged for this service should be less than the cost of a
UDRP dispute resolution proceeding.
245. See UDRP, supra note 3, § 4(a)-(c).
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registrant is found not to have a legitimate interest in the name,
and, failing that, for a domain name sharing order, in the event that
the registrant is found to have a legitimate interest. Ultimately, the
sharing system could be extended to multiple shared registrations,
provided that all claimants could establish a legitimate interest in
utilizing the domain name.
PersonalNames
Another area in which trademark policies, including those
developed to address cybersquatting, are proving to be a poor fit for
regulating domain name disputes is in the area of personal names.
Sometimes, personal names operate like trademarks, particularly
when attached to celebrities who may hold some trademark, or
trademark-like, rights in their names due to the commercial
goodwill attached to the names.247 However, personal names may
have various social values attached to them. Not all celebrity names
Personal names of celebrities and
operate as trademarks.
noncelebrities alike may further contain elements worthy of legal
protection on alternative bases, such as privacy policy. Additionally,
personal names may be used publicly for other important social
reasons outside of the purely commercial arena. An obvious
example is political purposes. It is likely that trademark principles
and privacy policies are both poor fits for the protection of politician
names. Some new principles might need to be developed to regulate
registration of domain names corresponding to politician names.248
The following discussion considers issues that may arise during
the course of registration of domain names that correspond to: (a) a
celebrity's name;2 49 (b) a politician's name;... and (c) a private
individual's name, when that person is neither a celebrity nor a
politician.25 ' This discussion illustrates the fact that the domain
name system's current reliance on principles of trademark and
unfair competition law and policy has left important policy gaps in
the regulation of domain name registration. This discussion further
suggests that it may now be necessary to reconsider what kinds of
legal rights should inhere in private individuals with respect to the
registration of domain names that correspond to their personal
E.

246. This argument would be made under the existing UDRP provisions.
See id. § 4(i).

247. See infra Part IV.E.1.
248. See, e.g., California Political Cyberfraud Abatement Act, CAL. ELEc.

CODE

§§ 18320-18323 (Deering Supp. 2005).

249. See infra Part IV.E.1.
250. See infra Part IV.E.2.
251. See infra Part IV.E.3.
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names, particularly in the ".com" space.
The discussion also emphasizes the fact that this area of domain
name policy has increasing international significance because of the
global reach of the Internet and the fact that multiple persons
around the globe may share a similar, or identical, name. Contests
may arise as to who has superior rights to domain names that
correspond to personal names when different people share those
names and when each of them has very different interests in the
corresponding domain names. Additionally, disputes may arise,
particularly in the celebrity and political arena, as to who has better
rights to a domain name that corresponds with a celebrity or
politician personal name and that may be used to host a Web site
that comments favorably or unfavorably on the activities of the
person in question. Finally, there is a question as to whether an
individual's right to a domain name corresponding to her personal
name should be limited to an affirmative right to use the name
herself, or whether it should be extended to a right to prevent or
restrict others from using the relevant domain name, even if she has
no desire to use the name herself.
1.

Celebrity Names

Celebrity names have already fueled some disputes under the
UDRP. High-profile disputes will often arise involving the names of
famous actors and musicians. One well-publicized dispute involved
a domain name corresponding to the name of Julia Roberts, the
Academy Award-winning actress who has appeared in a number of
well-known films, including Pretty Woman ,25 Notting Hill, 25 4 and
Erin Brockovich.255 On November 9, 1998, Russell Boyd registered
the domain name juliaroberts.com.256 Boyd placed a photograph of a
woman named Sari Locker on the Web site, and he later placed the
domain name up for auction on the commercial auction Web site,
www.eBay.com. 2 7 At the time, Boyd had registered over fifty other
domain names, including domain names which incorporated the
names of other famous movie actors such as Madeleine Stowe and Al
Pacino.258
252. A recent WIPO report considered some of these issues with respect to
the newer, and less well utilized, ".name" space. New Generic Top-Level
95-107.
Domains, supra note 5,
253. PRETTY WOMAN (Touchstone Pictures 1990).
254. NoTrING HILL (Universal Pictures 1999).
255. ERIN BROCKOVICH (Universal Pictures 2000).
256. Roberts v. Boyd, Case No. D2000-0210, § 4 (WIPO Arb. and Mediation
Ctr., Admin. Panel Decision, May 29, 2000) (Page, Abel, & Bridgeman, Arbs.),
at http://arbiter.wipo.intdomains/decisionshtml/2000/d2000-0210.html.
257. Id.
258. Id. The Al Pacino domain name currently links to a Web site with an
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In March 2000, Julia Roberts commenced a UDRP arbitration
proceeding against Boyd from which she successfully obtained an
order that the domain name be transferred to her.259 As of the date
of this writing, the domain name is not in use. 26' The basis for the
decision in the arbitration was that Julia Roberts had a common law
trademark right in her name and, further, that Boyd had no
legitimate rights or interests in the name and registered and used
the domain name in bad faith.26'
This decision may seem unremarkable in its results on policy
grounds. Presumably, many of us would agree that a famous
actress has a legitimate interest in ensuring that a domain name
corresponding to her personal name is not used in a manner
unauthorized and potentially damaging, either personally or
She may or may not have been particularly
professionally.
concerned with Boyd's actual use of the domain name at the time of
the arbitration proceeding. Her concern may have primarily been
with what might happen if someone bought the domain name on
eBay and used it in a harmful way. On the other hand, she may
have been concerned that Internet users would type juliaroberts.com
into an Internet browser and be taken to a Web site that had
nothing to do with her. This latter possibility seems unlikely as
Roberts herself has not, in the ensuing years, used the domain name
for any kind of authorized fan Web site.
The real question stemming from this dispute regards the
nature of the actual legal and policy basis for the decision. For
Roberts to have succeeded under the terms of the UDRP, she was
forced to establish common law trademark rights in her personal
name because this is the basis for claiming a right in a domain name
under the UDRP.262 It may not always be easy for celebrities to
unauthorized fan page for Al Pacino, with particular reference to one of Pacino's
films, The Devil's Advocate. See One More Humble Unofficial Al Pacino Fan

Page, at http://www.alpacino.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2005). The Madeleine
Stowe domain name currently links to a Web site displaying the enigmatic
phrase "Life is Punderful!" and nothing more. See http://www.madeleinestowe.
Both the alpacino.com and the
com (last visited Nov. 22, 2005).
madelienestowe.com domain names are, according to Network Solutions records,
still registered to Russell Boyd. See Network Solutions, WHOIS Record for
alpacino.com, at http://www.networksolutions.com/whois/results.jhtmljsession
id=SYU4AQOIVHYIOCWKEAPSFFA?whoistoken=O&imageKeyPage=/whois/en
try.jhtml&_requestid=1418646 (last visited Nov. 22, 2005); Network Solutions,
WHOIS Record for madeleinestowe.com, at http://www.networksolutions.com/

whois/results.jhtmljsessionid=SYU4AQOIVHYIOCWKEAPSFFA?whoistoken=3
&imageKeyPage=/whois/entry.jhtml&_requestid=1418740 (last visited Nov. 22,
2005).
259. Roberts, Case No. D2000-0210, §§ 3, 7.
260. See http://www.juliaroberts.com (last attempted Nov. 22, 2005).
261. Roberts, Case No. D2000-0210, §§ 6, 7.
262. UDRP, supra note 3, § 4(a)(i).
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establish this kind of interest in a domain name corresponding in
whole, or in part, to their personal names. Additionally, it may well
be impossible for noncelebrities to establish common law trademark
rights in their names for the purposes of UDRP policy. 263
Additionally, the Roberts case is a relatively easy case because Boyd
had no apparent legitimate competing interest in the domain name.
The UDRP might not be as helpful in situations where the validity
of the domain name's alternative use is not so clear cut. Boyd, for
example, has retained his registration of the alpacino.com domain
name but has inserted an unofficial fan site on the corresponding
Web page presumably to avoid losing another domain name
challenge.
UDRP arbitrators have certainly had to walk a fine line in
terms of determining whether a competing use of a celebrity name
in a domain name is a legitimate use. In a case involving the
domain name brucespringsteen.com, a WIPO administrative panel
was forced to decide whether an unofficial fan site could use the
name in the face of a challenge by famous singer Bruce Springsteen
himself.264 The domain name had been registered in 1996 by Jeff

Burgar in Canada, who used the name for an unauthorized fan Web
site.265 Like Boyd in the Roberts arbitration, Burgar had registered
multiple domain names corresponding to the personal names of
famous people.2 66 The arbitration panel, however, ultimately held
that Burgar was making a legitimate, noncommercial use of the
domain name and that Springsteen had failed to show that the
domain name was registered or used in bad faith.267 This decision
was not unanimous, though, with one dissenting panelist arguing
268
that the domain name should be transferred to Springsteen.
In comparing the Roberts and Springsteen arbitrations, several
trends in domain name regulation come to light. These trends were
perhaps already apparent in the drafting of the UDRP, but the
Roberts and Springsteen arbitrations bring these issues into sharp
relief. First, it is clear that the domain name system, as currently
regulated, relies heavily, perhaps overly so, on the establishment of
trademark rights, or trademark-like interests, in domain names,
even when the domain names correspond to personal names. It may

263. See infra Part IV.E.3.
264. Springsteen v. Burgar, Case No. D2000-1532, § 4 (WIPO Arb. and

Mediation Ctr., Admin. Panel Decision, Jan. 5, 2001) (Harris, Froomkin, &
Page,
Arbs.), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d20001532.html.
265. Id. § 5.
266. Id..
267. Id. §§ 6, 7.
268. Id. at Dissent (Page, Arb., dissenting).
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be possible for famous actors and singers to establish such rights,
but it will be difficult for many other people to demonstrate these
kinds of interests in their personal names. Even some well-known
celebrities may have trouble establishing requisite trademark-like
rights in their personal names. 69 The same is likely true of many
politicians. 2 70 The majority panel in the Springsteen arbitration was
not fully convinced that Springsteen could support a claim for
trademark rights corresponding to his personal name.

27

'

The

majority was, however, prepared to assume that he did have such
rights, as the arbitration could be decided on other grounds:
It is common ground that there is no registered trademark
in the name "Bruce Springsteen." In most jurisdictions where
trade marks are filed, it would be impossible to obtain a
registration of a name of that nature. Accordingly, Mr.
Springsteen must rely on common law rights to satisfy this
element of the three part test [under the UDRP].
It appears to be an established principle from cases such as
Jeanette Winterson, Julia Roberts, and Sade that in the case
of very well known celebrities, their names can acquire a
distinctive secondary meaning giving rise to rights equating to
unregistered
trade
marks,
notwithstanding
the
non-registrability of the name itself. It should be noted that
no evidence has been given of the name "Bruce Springsteen"
having acquired a secondary meaning, [or] in other words, a
recognition that the name should be associated with activities
beyond the primary activities of Mr. Springsteen as a
composer, performer and recorder of popular music.
In the view of this Panel, it is by no means clear from the
UDRP that it was intended to protect proper names of this
nature. As it is possible to decide the case on other grounds,
however, the Panel will proceed on the assumption that the
name Bruce Springsteen is protected under the policy...."

269. See id. § 6 (summarizing other WIPO arbitration decisions involving
famous celebrities); Turner v. Fahmi, Case No. D2002-0251 (WIPO Arb. and
Mediation Ctr., Admin Panel Decision, July 4, 2002) (Barker, Ryan, & Page
Arbs.), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/htmlV2002d2002-0251.html
(holding that Turner's complaint did not meet the three elements necessary for
a violation of UDRP trademark infringement); Sumner v. Urvan, Case No.
D2000-0596 (WIPO Arb. and Mediation Ctr., Admin. Panel Decision, July 20,
2000) (Christie, Arb.), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/
d2000-0596.html (holding that the complaint of Sumner (professionally known
as "Sting") failed to meet the common law elements of trademark infringement).
270. See infra Part IV.E.2.
271. Springsteen, Case No. D2000-1532, § 6.
272. Id.
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Given this attitude by the majority panelists in the Springsteen
decision, it is possible that many celebrities, even very well-known
celebrities, could have a difficult time establishing the requisite
trademark interests in their personal names for UDRP purposes.
This would certainly suggest that noncelebrities would likely be
unable to establish such rights at all and, accordingly, that the
UDRP would not protect any interests in domain names
corresponding to personal names of noncelebrities. The Springsteen
majority panel noted that it was unconvinced that the UDRP is
intended to protect proper names. 273 However, this leaves open the
question of whether we need any kind of legal policies or rules that
would protect such names, either as an addendum to, or
independently of, the UDRP. In the United States, the ACPA has,
to some extent, filled this gap.274 However, the ACPA's approach to
protecting personal names is arguably out of step with much of
traditional trademark policy and has not been followed on the global
stage. Additionally, it has some serious practical limitations, in that
it requires the bad-faith registrant to have a profit motive by
seeking to sell the domain name either to the person with whose
name it corresponds or to a third person. 5 In practice, this is not
always the case when personal names are involved in domain name
disputes, although it was the case in the Roberts dispute. 6
A second point to note arising from the Roberts arbitration and,
especially, the Springsteen arbitration is that, even where
trademark interests in a name can be established by a complainant,
a respondent does not have to go to very much effort to set up some
form of legitimate competing interest in a disputed domain name.27 7
Presumably, Boyd established his unauthorized Al Pacino fan site in
the wake of the Roberts decision to ensure that he did not lose the
alpacino.com domain name.
The site is not particularly
sophisticated, nor is it by any means comprehensive.
It is likely
that it is being used to prevent a successful challenge by Al Pacino
or his management.
It would seem, from the Springsteen
arbitration, that any kind of commentary on a Web site relating to a
celebrity, no matter how superficial, will suffice to show a legitimate
competing interest in the relevant domain name. Thus, it will be

273. Id.
274. See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
275. 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A) (2000).
276. Roberts v. Boyd, Case No. D2000-0210, § 4 (WIPO Arb. and Mediation
Ctr., Admin. Panel Decision, May 29, 2000) (Page, Abel, & Bridgeman, Arbs.),
at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html]2000/d2000-0210.html.
277. Springsteen, Case No. D2000-1532, § 5.
278. See One More Humble Unofficial Al Pacino Fan Page, at http://www.
alpacino.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2005).
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very difficult for a celebrity, or anyone else, for that matter, to prove
that any vaguely justifiable use of a domain name is not a
legitimate, good-faith use of the name for UDRP purposes.
Thus, the UDRP generally provides only weak protection for
personal names, including the personal names of celebrities, which
are the most likely candidates for protection under the UDRP, as
celebrities are the group of people most likely able to establish some
form of trademark rights in their personal names. This result raises
a number of questions about the regulation of domain names
corresponding to personal names. Should anyone have a legally
protected right in a domain name corresponding to their personal
name?279 If so, should celebrities have different rights than
noncelebrities, either on the basis of commercial goodwill associated
with their personal names or on some other basis? If there are legal
rights in domain names corresponding to personal names, should
they be in the nature of affirmative rights to use the name in
commerce, as desired by Bruce Springsteen, or should they also
encompass negative rights to prevent the name from being used at
all by anyone, as apparently desired by Julia Roberts?
For the most part, these questions pertain to various different
classes of personal names that correspond to domain names, not
simply to celebrity names. However, it is interesting to begin
discussion about them in the celebrity-name context. For example,
does Julia Roberts really want to assert a commercial property-like
right in juliaroberts.com, like Bruce Springsteen apparently did
with his corresponding domain name, or, rather, does she want the
protection of a privacy-like right? If her aim is to prevent anyone
from using the domain name, it may be that this is an area for
development of some privacy law principles.
The problem with drawing such a distinction between different
possible legal bases for such rights in domain names would
ultimately relate to the costs and difficulties inherent in
establishing precisely why a particular celebrity sought transfer of a
given domain name. Julia Roberts may, in reality, have a number of
reasons for seeking the domain name in question-perhaps both to
protect her privacy in controlling unauthorized content being
disseminated on a www.juliaroberts.com Web site and also partly to
preserve her later ability to commercialize the domain name
herself. 80
279. In the United States, personal protection from cybersquatting is

provided by 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A) (2000), as noted above.

280. Once again, at the time of this writing, Roberts has not done so.

Currently, the domain name is registered to Allen Klayman. Network
Solutions, WHOIS Record for juliaroberts.com,at http://www.networksolutions.
com/whois/results.jhtmljsessionid=52OIFXWCCOI4CWKEAPSFFA?whoistoke
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The question also arises as to whether it is efficient for people to
veto the use of particular domain names when it is possible that
someone else, other than the original, bad-faith registrant, may
have a legitimate use for the name. What if a private individual
named "Julia Roberts" also wanted the name for a personal Web site
and was barred from utilizing it because the celebrity Julia Roberts
acquired the name with no desire to use it herself? Should the
noncelebrity be relegated to the ".name" suffix, for instance, as a
matter of domain name policy? These are questions that cannot be
answered by traditional commercial trademark policy. They require
more detailed consideration of developing global norms relating to
Internet use and perceptions of the domain name system outside the
electronic commerce context.
Should ICANN, WIPO, or some other organization, for example,
be maintaining a register of nonpermitted uses of specific domain
names that would, nevertheless, allow registration and use for other
purposes? This might be similar to a restrictive covenant system on
a land title registry.281 Should the celebrity Julia Roberts be entitled
to veto registration of the juliaroberts.com domain name for
particular purposes, without: (a) being required to maintain
registration of the name herself; and (b) thereby preventing others
from making use of the name in a manner non-objectionable to her?
If we were to develop such a "veto" system, what would be the
legal basis of Roberts' rights in the domain name: property, privacy,
or something else? If it works like a land title registry with
restrictive covenant-like notations, then it sounds like a property
interest, even though Roberts may only be intending to guard her
privacy. This suggestion raises some difficult questions of legal
theory which may or may not need resolution before such a system
could be practically implemented. It may be that the nature of the
precise legal rights at issue here defies classification under
traditional legal categories and that a new form of domain name
rights corresponding to personal names must be developed for these
purposes.
In fact, this suggestion is not unlike some of the strategies
adopted with respect to the registration of some of the newer gTLDs
since 2000. In a recent report, the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation

n=O&imageKeyPage=/whois/entry.jhtml&_requestid=1424297 (last visited Nov.
22, 2005).
281. For more general discussions about how land law principles relating to
rights and obligations of land use could be incorporated into the cyberlaw/
information law area, see Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property
through a Property Paradigm, 54 DuKE L.J 1 (2004); Jacqueline Lipton,
Information Property:Rights and Responsibilities,56 FLA.L. REV. 135 (2004).
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Center evaluated some of the "preventive" measures. 2 taken in the
new gTLD spaces, such as ".name" and ".pro," in order to restrict
undesirable uses of domain names in these spaces.283 Some of the
strategies employed in these newer domain name spaces included:
(a) setting up a "watch" service to enable people with a legitimate
interest in a mark, word, or name corresponding to a domain name
to be notified if anyone attempted to register the name, without a
requirement that the "watcher" register the name herself;28 4 and

(b) a "defensive registration" service that allows a person with a
legitimate interest in a domain name to register it without having to
actively use it. 28 5 The report also discusses the viability of "exclusion

mechanisms" that would prevent the registration of domain names
by people likely to utilize them in undesirable ways.2 86 However,
such exclusion mechanisms have not yet been implemented with
respect to any of the new or old gTLDs.2 7
The "veto" system suggested above is, perhaps, a little more
sophisticated than these alternative approaches, because it focuses
on allowing the use of a given domain name for specific purposes
and only vetoing its use for undesirable purposes. It does not
potentially take a particular domain name off the market altogether
if someone wants to register it defensively or object to its
registration by someone else. However, this veto system does have
the disadvantage of requiring the development of policy guidelines
as to the basis and scope of potential impermissible uses of a given
domain name. This is likely to be a complex task and one in which
bodies like WIPO and ICANN may be loathe to engage. Further, if
such a scheme were ever to be implemented, it might require
administrative oversight with more complex determinations than
are required by domain name "watch" services, "defensive
registration" services, or even basic "exclusion mechanisms." The
administrative oversight required for a veto system may, thus, be
much more costly and time consuming than these alternatives.
In fact, a de facto "veto" scheme may actually be achievable
282. In the report, "preventive" measures are contrasted with "curative"
measures. Preventive measures refer to measures that can be taken prior to a
dispute arising in order to minimize the possibility that a dispute will arise by
allowing an interested person some measure of control over a domain name
corresponding to a legitimate interest in the domain name. Curative measures
relate to dispute resolution procedures that are utilized after a dispute arises.
New Generic Top-Level Domains, supra note 5, [ 22. Preventive and curative
measures can be utilized in concert, as the following discussion will
demonstrate.
283. Id. I 95-107.
284. See id.
120-21.
285. See id. 122.
286. See id. 123.
287. Id.

1422

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

under the current domain name registration system without the
need to create a registry of impermissible uses of particular Internet
domain names. Assuming that an individual like Julia Roberts
would be able to gain control of a relevant domain name utilizing
the UDRP procedures, she could then make private arrangements to
transfer or license that name to a new user for an agreed upon,
legitimate purpose. However, there are three main weaknesses with
this solution, as compared with developing a more formalized
registry system as contemplated above.
First, as noted above, it is not always easy, under current
domain name policy, for affected individuals to gain control of
domain names corresponding to their own personal names,
particularly in the ".com," "net," and ".org" domain spaces. The
ability to do so would have to be built into a new system to make
any of these solutions workable. Second, having gained control of
such a name, the "rightful registrant" would need to have some
incentive to allow legitimate, non-objectionable uses to be made of
the name by another person. It is not immediately obvious what
such incentives might be, assuming that the registrant would have
the option of simply holding the name and preventing all
unauthorized uses of it. Finally, even if the registrant did permit a
non-objectionable use of the name by private contract, reliance on
such agreements has the obvious drawback that they are only
enforceable between the contracting parties. Thus, if a transferee or
licensee of a relevant domain name later sold or licensed it to a third
party for impermissible purposes, the original registrant would
potentially be limited in her legal recourse, aside from returning to
the UDRP and starting again with a new arbitration proceeding
against the third party. These risks may well mitigate against
people entering into private arrangements to facilitate legitimate,
unobjectionable uses of particular domain names.
On the other hand, perhaps private individuals and celebrities,
in particular, should have no specific legal rights in relation to
".com," ".net," or ".org" domain names corresponding to their
personal names, outside of any trademark interests that may have
become associated with the name. If the true concern is with Web
site content, perhaps such individuals should always be required to
structure their complaints in terms of, for instance, defamation law,
privacy law,2"' or the "celebrity tort" in relevant jurisdictions.
288. A good example of the use of privacy-like laws to protect celebrity
interests was the use of the breach of confidence and the breach of relevant
provisions of the European Union Data Protection Directive in the litigation
brought by Catherine Zeta-Jones and Michael Douglas against a freelance
journalist and a variety of publications that published unauthorized
photographs of their wedding. See Douglas v. Hello!, [2003] 3 All E.R. 996 (Q.B.
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Domain name registration is, arguably, one step removed from
actual Web site content and should be treated accordingly by the
legal and regulatory system. Domain names could be regarded as
merely one of many possible indicators as to where an Internet user
may find particular information about a given celebrity. On this
analysis, the complainant should focus on Web site content, rather
than who has registered a particular domain name.
In this vein, the respondent in the Springsteen arbitration made
covers.290
an analogy between Internet domain names and magazine
He suggested that the mere use of the name of a celebrity on the
front page of a magazine does not mean that the magazine is
claiming any kind of specific rights in relation to the name, but
merely that it features content about the individual in question.29 '
This argument contemplates the use of a domain name as a pointer
to published information about a celebrity, whether the information
is authorized or unauthorized and independently of whether the
publisher of the information might be subject to any liability with
respect to the content of the information. This might suggest that
the UDRP should not protect any celebrities' interests in ".com,"
.net," or ".org" names corresponding to their personal names and,
perhaps, that the law should focus on the content of Web sites and
not the control of a particular domain name in these cases.
However, the main problem with this suggestion is that it
implicitly assumes that these categories of domain names should
only be legally protected in the hands of their "rightful" owners,
when they connote a traditional trademark interest and not when
they protect other socially important interests, like identities of
individuals, whether or not the individuals are trying to control
permitted uses of their names in a trademark sense. Again, it
assumes a limited role for domain name policy outside the
protection of commercial trademark concerns, and, even then, the
current policy only protects those concerns in the face of bad-faith
cybersquatters and not against those making legitimate, if
Ch. 2003). See also, e.g., A v. B p.l.c., [2003] 3 W.L.R. 542 (C.A. 2002);
Wainwright v. Home Office, [2002] 3 W.L.R. 405 (C.A. 2001); Douglas v. Hello!,
[2001] 2 W.L.R. 992 (C.A. 2000); Greitje Baars, Graspingat Nettles: An Analysis
of the Douglas v. Hello! Case, 3 PRIvAcY & DATA PROTECTION 7 (2003).
289. See generally Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d
831, 834-37 (6th Cir. 1983), affd, 810 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1987); Michael J.
Breslin, ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing Inc.: Turning an Athlete's Publicity Over
to the Public, 11 J. INTELL. PRop. L. 369 (2004); J. Thomas McCarthy, Melville B.
Nimmer and the Right of Publicity:A Tribute, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1703 (1987).
290. See Springsteen v. Burgar, Case No. D2000-1532, § 5 (WIPO Arb. and
Mediation Ctr., Admin. Panel Decision, Jan. 5, 2001) (Harris, Froomkin, 0&
Arbs.), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d200 Page,
1532.html.
291. Id.
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superficial, uses of the name, at least in the celebrity-name
context.292 If this decision has, in fact, been made at a policy level, it
has been made too rashly and too early in the development of
Internet usage to take into account other important emerging social
norms in relation to domain name usage. It is more likely that such
a policy decision has never been consciously made by any
government or regulatory authority. Rather, commercial trademark
cybersquatting was the most pressing concern in the 1990s, and it is
the main issue that has been expressly dealt with to date as a
matter of policy, particularly in the ".com," and, to some extent, also
the ".net" and ".org" domain spaces. It is now time to start
regulating other aspects of domain name policy.
As noted above, Congress has created a special protection for
domain names corresponding to personal names under section 1129
of the Lanham Act (as part of ACPA revisions to the Act).293 This
pre-dated the introduction of the ".name" space and was drafted
with the original gTLDs, such as ".com," ".net," and ".org," in mind.
To succeed under this section, the complainant must establish that
the defendant had an intent to profit from selling the domain
name. 2" This is consistent with the aim of the ACPA to prevent
traditional cybersquatting activities.295 However, the profit motive
may not always be evident in situations where individuals are
seeking to prevent certain uses of domain names corresponding to
their own personal names. Although Julia Roberts could have
utilized this approach with respect to Boyd's attempt to sell
juliaroberts.com on eBay, people like Bruce Springsteen and Al
Pacino could not have availed themselves of section 1129 against the
individuals who simply maintained unauthorized fan sites attached
to the relevant domain names brucespringsteen.com and
alpacino.com. There was no apparent attempt to sell either of those
names to the "rightful" owners, nor to anyone else as required by
section 1129.
The section 1129 approach also appears unlikely to be adopted
on a more global scale. The Report of the Second WIPO Internet
Domain Name Process rejected a call to insert similar
considerations into the UDRP, feeling that this would make UDRP
disputes more confusing and difficult to decide, in that it would raise
a complex set of privacy and property rights in relation to certain
domain names.299 WIPO was concerned that the incorporation of
292. One example of the latter is the current alpacino.com Web site. See
supra note 258 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
295. See supra Part III.C.
296. Second WIPO Report, supra note 102,
199-203.
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such a provision in the UDRP might "jeopardize the credibility and
efficiency of the UDRP," particularly given the lack of international
norms about protecting rights in personal names.297 This may well
have been a legitimate concern in 2001, when the UDRP was fairly
new and needed to be developed, accepted, and understood by the
Internet community.
However, now that the UDRP is well established and is
relatively successful within its limited sphere of operation, it might
be time to start developing new international policies relating to the
protection of rights in personal names that could be implemented
alongside the current UDRP provisions. This would allow a more
comprehensive, if more complex, system of domain name dispute
resolution procedures to develop, in order to better account for the
complex relationships that can arise in relation to domain names.
Such a system could involve elements of domain name sharing, as
suggested above, as well as the possibility of establishing a register
of impermissible uses of particular domain names that could be
requested by those with a particular personal, or perhaps even
cultural or religious,298 interest in a given domain name. Such a
register could draw from strategies employed in relation to the
".name" space, such as the "watch" service and "defensive
registration" service described above.299
2.

PoliticianNames

Politician names raise several more complex issues than do
celebrity names in the domain name context. While at least some
celebrity names will be protected under the provisions of the UDRP,
it appears relatively clear that politician names will not be protected
by the policy unless the politician in question can establish a
commercial value in the name, in the commercial trademark
sense. 300 As noted above, the UDRP requires a showing of a
trademark, or trademark-like interest, in a personal name that
corresponds to a domain name, in order for an arbitration
proceeding to be successful.3 1' There is some evidence that politician
names will not likely fit the bill here.
One of the landmark decisions under the UDRP involved
Kathleen Kennedy Townsend, who, at the time of the complaint,
was a second-term lieutenant governor of the State of Maryland and
a potential 2002 gubernatorial candidate. °2 Ultimately, her bid for
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Id. 201.
See discussion infra Part IV.F.
See supra notes 284-85 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 47, 50, 53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
Townsend v. Birt, Case No. D2002-0030, § 4 (WIPO Arb. and Mediation
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that office was unsuccessful.3 °3 Prior to the election year, the
respondent in the proceedings had registered a number of domain
names corresponding to Townsend's name, allegedly for the
purposes of selling them to her for a profit. 30 4 Although this was the

kind of dispute for which section 1129 was inserted into the Lanham
Act, Townsend proceeded under the UDRP and lost her claim on the
basis that the WIPO arbitration panel did not feel that she, as a
politician, could establish a sufficient trademark interest in her
personal name on which to succeed in a UDRP proceeding.0 5
The panel did, however, note that it is possible that a political
organization might have sufficient trademark rights in a candidate's
name or slogan upon which to base a UDRP challenge to a domain
name registration. 6 It further noted that, in the United States, at
least, the ACPA might provide some relief for politicians in
Townsend's position. 30 7 The panel concluded, however, that the
UDRP does not protect politicians against unauthorized
registrations of domain names corresponding to their personal
names. 308
In particular, the panel referred to the WIPO
recommendations mentioned above that clarified the fact that
persons who have not profited from a reputation in commerce, as
distinct from politics, cannot avail themselves of the UDRP to
protect their personal names against parasitic registrations.309
Thus, we see the results of a conscious policy choice at the
international level to leave protection of commercially valueless
names, at least valueless in the trademark sense, to the vestiges of
national laws and norms and not to attempt development of a set of
international norms on these issues. This may or may not be a
sensible long term strategy, depending on: (a) how global these
problems become on the Internet in the future and (b) how effective
national solutions prove to be.
Ctr., Admin. Panel Decision, Apr. 11, 2002) (Donahey, Davis III, Sellers, Arbs.),
at http://arbiter.wipo.inttdomains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0030.html.
303. Jabeen Bhatti & S.A. Miller, Ehrlich Wins in Stunning Upset: First
Republican to Take Maryland Since Agnew in '66, WASH. TIMEs, Nov. 6, 2002, at
Al.
304. Townsend, Case No. D2002-0030, § 4.
305. Id. §§ 6-7.
306. Id. § 6. Note that a later proceeding brought by a political group on
behalf of Townsend, Friends of Kathleen Kennedy Townsend, also did not result
in a transfer of the domain name. See Friends of Kathleen Kennedy Townsend
v. Birt, Case No. D2002-0451 (WIPO Arb. and Mediation Ctr., Admin. Panel
Decision, July 31, 2002) (Plant, Davis III, Page, Arbs.), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/
domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0451.html.
307. See Townsend, Case No. D2002-0030, § 6.
308. See id. § 7; UDRP, supra note 3, § 4(a).
309. Townsend, Case No. D2002-0030, § 6; See Second WIPO Report, supra
note 102,
199, 202.
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It may be that cases of political cybersquatting are peculiarly
national in scope. Most politicians are involved in positions on the
national, state, or local level. Coupled with WIPO's concerns about
the difficulties of formulating international norms on these
questions, perhaps this leads to a presumption that these matters
are best left to national legal systems for the moment. However,
this may well be changing. The European Union, for example, is
becoming an increasingly powerful governmental body, the scope of
which extends beyond any one set of national borders.
Additionally, even among existing nations, the actions of one
government often have the ability to impact policies and activities,
both social and economic, in other countries. One need only look to
the impact that American and British policies have had on the
Middle East in recent years to see that it might not only be
American norms that should govern the regulation of domain names
corresponding to George W. Bush's personal name, nor should it
necessarily be only British norms that govern what happens to Tony
Blair's name in a domain space.
Of course, one could argue that the above suggestions confuse
domain names as Web page identifiers with general free speech
rights to comment on government policy. As noted above in relation
to celebrity domain names, there is a powerful argument that
domain names are merely convenient pointers to Web sites that may
contain commentary about a person whose name is reflected in the
domain name. Domestic laws will provide liability for commentary
that is defamatory, regardless of the pointer that is used to access
the commentary.312 Defamation on the Internet can raise confusing
choice of law issues,313 but this is an issue separate from domain
name policy.
In any event, domain name activity with regard to politician

310. Barbara C. George et al., U.S. Multinational Employers: Navigating
Through the "Safe Harbor" Principles to Comply with the EU Data Privacy
Directive, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 735, 735-36 (2001).
311. Cf Aliya Haider, The Rhetoric of Resistance:Islamism, Modernity, and
Globalization, 18 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 91, 102 (2002) (acknowledging, in an
examination of Islamic rebellions, the growing economic, social, and political
interdependence of nations); James A. R. Nafziger, The General Admission of
Aliens under InternationalLaw, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 804, 834 (1983) (noting that
interpretations of British and American practices have strongly influenced
other nations).
312. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977). See generally Milkovich
v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1989) (discussing the history and
requirements of defamation law).
313. See Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Gutnick, [2002] 210 C.L.R. 575 (Austl.
2002) (involving the ultimate application of the Victorian state law of
defamation with respect to a publication originally uploaded onto Dow Jones'
subscription-based Web site in the United States).
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names, again, particularly in the ".com" domain space, seems to be
increasing and is raising many concerns, both about the regulation
of domain name registration and use as well as about the content of
Web sites. In the United States, even the ACPA provisions seem to
be falling short of meeting some of the perceived needs of players in
the political arena. For instance, section 1129(1)(A) of the Lanham
Act is targeted at activities that involve an intention to profit from
the registration of a person's domain name by selling the domain
name either to the person with whose name the domain name
corresponds or to a third party.314 It does not say anything about
domain name registrations that are intended to prevent access to a
domain name-for example, where a rival political party or interest
group wants to hold the domain name "hostage," in order to prevent
the "rightful" owner from using it at all.
This will increasingly become a problem in practice, as
politicians, in particular, are beginning to realize the potential of the
Internet as both a fundraising mechanism and an important
communications medium with respect to campaign activity. Both
John Kerry and George W. Bush, in the campaign for the 2004 U.S.
presidential election, made significant use of their relevant domain
names, johnkerry.com3 15 and georgewbush.com.3 6 The Republican
effort had the foresight also to register bushcheney2004.com.3 7
However, the Democratic effort was too late to register either
kerryedwards2OO4.com or kerryedwards.com, which were both
already registered to others when John Edwards was named as the
2004 Democratic vice presidential candidate.318
314. The Lanham Act specifically states that:
Any person who registers a domain name that consists of the name
of another living person, or a name substantially and confusingly
similar thereto, without that person's consent, with the specific intent
to profit from such name by selling the domain name for financial gain
to that person or any third party, shall be liable in a civil action by
such person.
15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A) (2000) (emphasis added).
315. JohnKerry.com: Official Web site, at http://www.johnkerry.com (last
visited Nov. 22, 2005).
316. GOP.com: Republican National Committee, at http://www.georgewbush.
com (last visited Nov. 22, 2005).
Republican National
Committee,
at http:/www.
317. GOP.com:
bushcheney2004.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2005).
318. See Network Solutions, WHOIS Record for kerryedwards.com, at http:/l
www.networksolutions.com/whois/results.jhtmljsessionid=SL22S3VVKSYLMC
WKEAQCFEY?whoistoken=6&imageKeyPage=/whois/entry.jhtml&_requestid=
1430309 (last visited Nov. 22, 2005); Network Solutions, WHOIS Record for
kerryedwards2OO4.com,at http://www.networksolutions.com/whois/results.jhtml
jsessionid=U2Z1025ZJV2GYCWKEAQCFEQ?whoistoken=O&imageKeyPage=/
whois/entry.jhtml&_requestid=1339053 (last visited Nov. 22, 2005); David
McGuire, Kerry Team Shops for New Web Address, WASH. POST., July 6, 2004,
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In answer to the question introduced above, there now appears
to be a strong argument that the domain name itself is important in
a political campaign. If, for example, a Web site is going to be used
as a cybercenter for obtaining campaign support, particularly in
terms of fundraising, it is important that Internet users can have
confidence that a relevant Web site is authorized by the politician or
political group in question. As Americans in the lead up to the 2004
presidential election relied on Web sites to access the campaigns, it
was important that the Web site purporting to be collecting funds
for the Kerry-Edwards presidential bid, for example, was really
doing so.
Clearly, if a competing interest group "hijacked" the name and
collected funds under false pretenses, this would likely constitute
fraud of some description, 31 9 but it may be very difficult to raise a
relevant cause of action and work out precisely who has the
standing and resources to litigate. The same would be true of a Web
site that looks like it has been authorized by a candidate because of
the use of a domain name corresponding to the candidate's name,
but that actually contains misinformation about the candidate and
his or her policies. The easiest way to regulate this kind of activity
is to make sure that the obvious political candidate domain names
are registered to the actual candidates, at least for the campaign
periods preceding the relevant elections. Here, there is obviously an
important social value in preventing political fraud.
Some of the relevant activity is commercial here, particularly as
it relates to political fundraising, but it is not commercial in a
Thus, it is not appropriately regulated by
trademark sense.
trademark legislation, even if provisions of a law, such as the ACPA,
mistakenly purport to regulate these kinds of activities. There is
now some piecemeal state law that attempts to regulate political
cybersquatting in terms of the kinds of activities described above.
320
California's recently enacted Political Cyberfraud Abatement Act,

for example, creates civil liability for engaging in an act of "political
cyberfraud," which is defined in the legislation to mean:
a knowing and willful act concerning a political Web site that
is committed with the intent to deny a person access to a
political Web site, deny a person the opportunity to register a
domain name for a political Web site, or cause a person
at A5.
319. Horn v. Friedman & Co., 776 F.2d 777, 780 (8th Cir. 1985) (noting that
the elements of fraud include a false representation of material fact that the
defendant knows or believes is false, which the defendant intends the plaintiff
to rely on, and that the plaintiff does rely on to his injury).
320. CAL. ELEC. CODE, §§ 18320-23 (Deering Supp. 2005).
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reasonably to believe that a political Web site has been posted
by a person other than the person who posted the Web site,
and would cause a reasonable person, after reading the Web
site, to believe the site actually represents the views of the
proponent or opponent of a ballot measure."'
The definition goes on to give examples of political cyberfraud,
including: (a) "intentionally diverting or redirecting access to a
political Web site to another person's Web site" by using, inter alia,
"a similar domain name; 3 22 (b) "[r]egistering a domain name that is
similar to another domain name for a political Web site;"323 and (c)
"[i]ntentionally preventing the use of a domain name for a political
Web site by registering and holding the domain name or by reselling
it to another with the intent of preventing its use." 321 "Political Web
site," for the purposes of this legislation, is defined as "a Web site
that urges325or appears to urge the support or opposition of a ballot
measure."
Although the concerns addressed by the California Political
Cyberfraud Abatement Act seem very real, the development of this
legislation, in the wake of section 1129(1)(A) of the Lanham Act at
the federal level, evidences an increasingly fragmented approach to
the issue of cybersquatting involving personal names and political
names at the national level. Even within the United States, the
relevant laws are becoming fragmented as applied to the regulation
At the
of domain names that correspond to personal names.
international level, this fragmentation is obviously even worse, as
alluded to by WIPO in its report rejecting a more expansive scope
for the UDRP in this area. 26
It may well be the case that the UDRP per se should not be
extended to cover nontrademark uses of Internet domain names.
However, it is not necessarily true to say that the issue of personal
names should not be addressed altogether on a more global level
It is difficult to understand why
than is currently the case.
trademark policy can be regarded as sufficiently globally
harmonized to form the basis for a fast, effective, inexpensive,
multinational dispute resolution procedure, whereas other uses of
domain names have been deemed too problematic for a global
Surely, there may be an advantage in formulating
approach.
general international policy principles regarding domain names that
correspond to various classes of personal names, particularly if some
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

Id. § 18320(c)(1).
Id. § 18320(c)(1)(A).
Id. § 18320(c)(1)(C).
Id. § 18320(c)(1)(D).
Id. § 18320(c)(3).
Second WIPO Report, supra note 102, [[ 201-02.
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domain name sharing or temporary compulsory licensing practices
Global
could be developed, as suggested in this Article. 327
methodologies should certainly be developed in order to combat
political cyberfraud, as well as bad-faith commercial cybersquatting.
In any event, celebrity and political names are not the end of
the story here. There is also the issue of personal names without
any celebrity or political status, and celebrity names that correspond
to other interests that are neither commercial nor political-for
example, Madonna.3 28 Further, there is a question of competing
interests in other terms that can be used in an Internet domain
name, including geographical and cultural identifiers. If we leave
domain name regulation predominantly in the hands of trademark
law and policy for too long, we may develop a presumption that
trademark interests are the most important interests to protect in
cyberspace or, worse still, the only thing worthy of protection in
cyberspace, at least as far as the domain name system is concerned.
We might thus lose the opportunity to create policy principles and
regulatory procedures for protecting other important social interests
that are potentially impacted by domain name policy.
3.

Names of PrivateIndividuals

Personal names that do not have any particular celebrity or
other public status may also raise interesting questions with respect
To date, there has not been a
to domain name regulation.
significant presumption that a person has any special legal rights in
a domain name, aside from in the ".name" space, that happens to
correspond to that person's name, outside of the provisions of the
ACPA in the United States. As noted above, the ACPA inserted
section 1129 into the Lanham Act in order to create civil liability for
a person who registers a domain name that is the same as, or
confusingly similar to, a person's name, without that person's
consent and with the intent to profit by selling the domain to that
person or a third party. 29 There is no corresponding provision at the
international level 3 °
This part of the ACPA appears to have limited practical
application to date. This might be because situations have not
arisen that involve domain name cybersquatting with respect to
personal names that are not sufficiently famous to warrant
protection under the UDRP or the more trademark-focused

327. See infra Part IV.E.3 (discussing temporary compulsory licensing).
328. See infra notes 343-53 and accompanying text.
329. 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A) (2000).
330. See UDRP, supra note 3.
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provisions of the ACPA. 31 Private citizens might assume that they
have no particular legal rights in their personal names used as
domain names, resulting in their choice not to avail themselves of
the relevant provisions of the ACPA. On the other hand, it may be
that private citizens, in general, simply do not wish to register
domain names corresponding to their personal names.
Many
individuals with their own Web sites will avail themselves of a
domain space provided by their employer or Internet service
provider. 33' The view may be that, if there is no attempt to draw in
customers in a trademark sense, there is no need to have an
intuitive domain name. Further, private individuals can now
alternatively utilize the ".name" domain space for creating a private
personal domain name.331
Thus, there is a good argument that we do not need to develop
any particular laws and policies, other than, perhaps, provisions
such as those found in section 1129 of the Lanham Act, in order to
protect personal names registered as domain names. This type of
provision will protect those who want to register a domain name
corresponding to their personal name from predatory domain name
cybersquatters. Arguably, little more is needed. If this is the case,
there should potentially be no impediment to the adoption of similar
provisions at the international level, perhaps as an addition to the
UDRP. Such an approach should not be particularly problematic,
even taking into account concerns that the UDRP should not become
overcomplicated or confusing, leading to a loss of confidence in the
arbitration mechanism. A simple provision could be added to the
UDRP allowing individuals to bring complaints with respect to
registration of a domain name corresponding to the complainant's
personal name when the registrant has registered the name in bad
faith and has no demonstrable legitimate interest in the name.
Further difficult issues may arise in instances when a domain
name corresponding to a personal name also corresponds with a
valuable corporate trademark or with a celebrity or politician name.
A personal name might even correspond to a cultural reference or
geographical place name. It is these contests that will be more
difficult. Perhaps the answer here is for a clearer reliance on some
of the newer domain name suffixes, such as the ".name" space for
personal names, and perhaps ".org" for some of the cultural
331. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).
332. SHANE GREENSTEIN, COMMERCIALIZATION OF THE INTERNET: THE
INTERACTION OF PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE CHOICES; OR WHY INTRODUCING THE

17-18 (Ctr. for the Study of Indus. Org. at
Northwestern Univ., Working Paper No. 0010, 2000).
333. The Global Name Registry, Ltd., Global Name Registry-At a Glance, at
http://www.name/bf_about.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2005).
MARKET WORKED SO WELL
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references.
Alternatively, the domain name sharing option
suggested above, in relation to competing legitimate interests in
domain names, might be adopted in these kinds of situations.
There may still be difficulties with other cultural and
geographic references that correspond to personal names, and the
problem of political names corresponding to private individual's
names may also be a concern. The obvious recent example in the
United States is the kerryedwards.com domain name, which appears
to be jointly registered to two individuals, one of whom has the
name Kerry Edwards.8 4 In such situations, should there be a rule
that the political use takes priority in the ".com" space during a
relevant political campaign and, perhaps, also for any ensuing term
of office? It should be noted here that section 1129(1)(A) of the
Lanham Act is not particularly helpful in this kind of situation,
when both parties-Kerry Edwards and the Kerry/Edwards
campaign organization-have legitimate interests in the name.3 5 In
any event, Kerry Edwards, the individual, clearly did not register
the name with the intention of extorting money from the Democratic
Presidential campaign, as he had registered the name two years
before the Kerry/Edwards presidential ticket was announced.336
In these cases, a temporary compulsory licensing regime could
be developed to give rights in a ".com" domain space to political
domain names during the particular time period for which the name
is needed for political purposes. The social value protected here
would be the facilitation of communications and fundraising efforts
between candidates and the public during an election campaign. An
example of how compulsory licensing could be achieved would
include an administrative mechanism set up similarly to, or as part
of, the UDRP that would encourage private licensing arrangements
by mandating compulsory licensing in favor of a bona fide political
candidate whose personal name corresponds with the domain name
in question. The license could last for the duration of the electoral
campaign and might revert back to the original registrant after the
campaign. During the license term, the political candidate may be
required to pay royalties to the original registrant. Again, this
should not be too difficult to achieve in practice, as the only
334. The kerryedwards.com domain name was actually registered by Mr.
Kerry Edwards in 2002 for $15. In the months preceding the 2004 presidential
election, he engaged a professional Internet domain name auctioneer, Sedo.com
LLC, to field the six-figure offers he was receiving for the domain name after
John Kerry announced John Edwards as his vice presidential running mate.
See Press Release, PRWeb, KerryEdwards.com Domain Name to be Auctioned
(July 22, 2004), at http://www.prweb.com/releases/2004I7/prweb142903.htm
(last visited Nov. 22, 2005).
335. See 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A).
336. See supra note 334 and accompanying text.
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evidentiary requirements would relate to proof of personal names
and evidence of candidacy in an election. Licensing fees could be set
and updated either by ICANN or by arbitrators in individual cases.
Alternatively, a temporary domain name sharing arrangement
might be established along the lines suggested above in relation to
legitimate competing commercial interests in a domain name.3 3 7
This might better balance the social value in facilitating political
communications with any social values developed in relation to
personal domain name use more generally. Again, the process
should not be any more administratively complex than a compulsory
licensing agreement, as the arbitrators should only have to examine
evidence of personal names corresponding to domain names and the
existence of an electoral campaign.
There might also be situations in which a political candidate
wants to retain a domain name past a temporary licensing period.
This could occur either because she won an election or issue and
wants to continue to use the name to inform the public of ongoing
political developments during an ensuing term of office or because
she lost an election or issue but has developed a following of people
seeking information from the Web site. In such cases, provision
might be made for the compulsory license to continue until one or
both parties to the license loses interest in, or use for, the domain
name in question. Alternatively, if a particularly long-term license
appears to be developing due to ongoing circumstances in which the
name is potentially useful to both parties, provision might be built
into the relevant scheme for a final sale of the name, assuming a fair
price could be reached between the parties.3 38 Again, an even
simpler alternative might be to create a permanent domain name
sharing arrangement such as that suggested above in relation to
competing legitimate commercial trademark interests corresponding
to a given domain name. Such a system would not likely be too
conceptually difficult to develop or require expensive litigation, as
long as a suitable administrative mechanism could be established.
Of course, this mechanism might need to be limited to disputes
between politician names and other personal names.339 Contests
337. See supraPart IV.D.4.
338. Again, the regulator, whether it is ICANN or some other body
empowered by a relevant legislature, might assist in determining a fair price if
the parties could not reach agreement. This could be similar to the scheme for
assisting parties to establish fair licensing fees when they cannot themselves
reach agreement. Such regulatory intervention in determining fair prices for
sales and licenses of valuable intellectual property rights is not unprecedented.
For example, in the United Kingdom, the Patents Act of 1977 contemplates
government assistance in determining a fair price for the compulsory license of
a patent in appropriate circumstances. See Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 48 (Eng.).
339. Unless, of course, the relevant policy was changed to encourage domain
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between, say, trademarks and politician names may be more
difficult given current domain name policy, although, presumably,
such disputes would be rare in practice, because few politician
names likely correspond to valuable corporate trademarks. It is
more likely that a politician's name would conflict with a celebrity's
name that has corresponding trademark rights. However, again,
such cases would be rare, given that WIPO arbitrators, at least,
have taken the view that, in most cases, only the highest levels of
celebrity would give rise to corresponding trademark interests.34 ° In
order to conflict with a politician name, not only would a celebrity
name need to have achieved this status, but it would also need to
correspond to the politician's name. This would be a very rare case,
indeed.
Culturally SignificantNames and GeographicalLocations
A final potentially problematic category of domain name
disputes involves domain names that correspond to more
miscellaneous subjects, such as culturally significant names and
geographical locations. This is a difficult area because the social
and cultural norms that might be protected by granting legal rights
in these names are probably harder to establish with any degree of
certainty than those that might be protected with respect to
It may also be difficult to
trademarks and personal names.
entities should have
government
or
groups,
people,
which
establish
location
a
geographical
the strongest claim to a legal right in, say,
name or a cultural name linked with a particular geographical place
or group of people. In the Report of the Second WIPO Internet
Domain Name Process, WIPO recommended leaving domain name
issues in these areas unresolved for further consideration.341 With
respect to names of indigenous people in particular, WIPO
suggested that further consideration could take place, including
through WIPO's process of investigating intellectual property and
genetic resources, traditional knowledge, and folklore. 42
A variety of difficult issues would arise in these areas if a
property-rights regime, or something similar, was established for
relevant domain names. Such rights may well conflict with other
rights deriving from corporate and personal domain names. Thus,
the matrix for resolving domain name disputes becomes even more

F.

name sharing arrangements in these circumstances.
340. See, e.g., Springsteen v. Burgar, Case No. D2000-1532, § 6 (WIPO Arb.
and Mediation Ctr., Admin. Panel Decision, Jan. 5, 2001) (Harris, Froomkin, &
Arbs.), at http://arbiter.wipo.intdomains/decisions/html/2000/d2000Page,
1532.html.
341. Second WIPO Report, supra note 102, 297.
342. Id.

1436

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

complex when cultural and geographical indicators are added into
the mix. An obvious example of where competing commercial,
personal, and cultural interests may clash in one domain name
could be the case of madonna.com. This domain name is currently
registered to the pop singer Madonna.34 She has also registered
"Madonna" as a trademark. 41 She therefore has trademark
interests in the name by virtue of the trademark registration,
probably through common law trademark rights, and, perhaps,
through celebrity rights in the name. However, the name clearly
corresponds with other cultural interests, especially in relation to
religious and artistic representations of the mother of Christ.
To date, the disputes involving the madonna.com domain name
have revolved around competing trademark interests in the name,
rather than cultural or religious interests.34 5 As noted above, the
singer Madonna has registered trademark rights in the "Madonna"
name. 346 The madonna.com domain name was originally registered
to a man called Dan Parisi in New York who had also registered the
trademark "Madonna" under Tunisian law, expressly in order to
defend any challenge by the singer to his domain name
registration.34 7 Parisi admitted during the course of the UDRP
proceedings that he only obtained the Tunisian trademark in order
to protect his interests in the domain name. 348 He was not located in
Tunisia at the time, nor did he register the mark for the purpose of
making any bona fide use of the mark in commerce in Tunisia.349
Parisi, presumably, chose Tunisian law because registration of
trademarks in Tunisia proceeds without any substantive
examination.5 °
In a proceeding under the UDRP, Madonna received a ruling
that the domain name be transferred to her on the basis that Parisi

343. The domain name is registered to BoyToy, Inc., which is known to be
affiliated with the pop singer known as Madonna. Network Solutions, WHOIS
Record for madonna.com, at http://www.networksolutions.com/whois/results.
jhtmljsessionid=BZYT1TGH2QXEACWKEAQSFFA?whoistoken=0&imageKey
Page=/whois/entry.jhtml&_requestid=1430270 (last visited October 30, 2005).
344. See U.S. Trademark No. 1,473,554 (registered Jan. 18, 1989), at http:/!
tess2.uspto.gov/bin/showfield?f=doc&state=ctbup4..2.1; U.S. Trademark No.
1,463,601 (registered Nov. 3, 1987), at http://tess2.uspto.govbin/showfield?
f=doc&state=ctbup4.3.
345. Ciccone v. Parisi, Case No. D2000-0847, §§ 4-5 (WIPO Arb. and
Mediation Ctr., Admin. Panel Decision, Oct. 12, 2000) (Partridge, Dabney, and
Sorkin, Arbs.), at http://arbiter.wipo.intdomains/decisions/html/2000/d20000847.html.
346. See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
347. Ciccone, Case No. D2000-0847, §§ 1, 4.
348. Id. § 6.
349. Id.
350. Id.
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had registered the mark in bad faith and had no legitimate interest
in it. 351 However, Madonna was in an unusually strong position in

relation to other celebrity names because she had obtained a valid
trademark registration of the name in the United States. As we saw
in the preceding discussion, some other famous celebrities have had
problems in this respect, with the Springsteen arbitration as an
obvious example. 352 Thus, under this analysis, the madonna.com
example should fall into the class of domain names discussed first in
this categorization scheme-domain names corresponding to
valuable commercial trademarks. Madonna as an individual may
have had less success under the UDRP had she not established
registered trademark rights corresponding to her alleged common
law rights in the word "Madonna." Additionally, any other religious
or cultural group interested in the name is unlikely to have any
success in establishing rights in the word, given the fact that the
singer's registered trademark rights have now been successfully
defended in a UDRP proceeding. None of this, necessarily, is meant
to say that Madonna, the singer, does not have the best rights to the
madonna.com domain name. However, it does evidence the manner
in which the domain name system has become skewed in its
protection of trademark rights, particularly in cases where personal
names are only effectively protected on a global level if they
correspond to registered trademarks or powerful common law
trademarks.5 3
WIPO was probably correct in 2001 when it suggested that
some of the more complex domain name issues require further
scrutiny, consideration, and comment before any decisive legal and
policy rules are formulated to deal with them."
Geographical
indicators and cultural references are likely the most obvious
candidates for further consideration. However, it is important that
consideration is given sooner, rather than later, and that a debate
begins on global principles. Otherwise, we risk the very real
possibility that commercial interests, and trademarks, in particular,
will come to dominate all law and policy as it applies to domain
names. It is possible that very real interests are being overlooked
and will continue to be overlooked, unless the debate is refocused to

351. Id. § 7.
352. Springsteen v. Burgar, Case No. D2000-1532, § 7 (WIPO Arb. and
Mediation Ctr., Admin. Panel Decision, Jan. 5, 2001) (Harris, Froomkin, &
Page,
Arbs.), at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2O001532.html.
353. Although personal names do get some protection under the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A)
(2000).
354. Second WIPO Report, supra note 102, 297.
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take account of some of these issues.
Various possibilities for legal reform exist, including: (a)
mandated division of gTLDs so the same person or organization
cannot monopolize different gTLD forms of the same name; (b)
promotion of domain name sharing systems, in appropriate cases, in
which two or more individuals or entities with similar legitimate
competing interests in the same domain name jointly host the
relevant Web site containing hyperlinks to their respective main
Web pages on a permanent or temporary basis; 355 (c) development of
a compulsory licensing system to operate on a temporary basis and
356
which might ultimately result in a final sale, in appropriate cases;
and (d) creation of a "veto" system for personal and, perhaps, also
cultural and religious interests in relevant domain names, modeled
on the restrictive covenant model from land law.357 This would allow
those with particular personal, social, or cultural interests in a given
domain name to register impermissible uses of the name that would
be binding on all subsequent registrants, without requiring the
person seeking the veto to maintain registration of the name herself.
The domain name "watch" services, "defensive registration" services,
and "exclusion mechanisms" recently evaluated by the WIPO
Arbitration and Mediation Center 35 8 may also have a role to play,
particularly with respect to any new gTLDs introduced in the
future, as well as specific iterations of domain names in existing
gTLD spaces that have yet to be registered.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article has attempted to identify some of the more obvious
social values we may consider promoting in a more expansive
approach to domain name registration and dispute resolution. They
include the protection of the policies underlying the trademark
system, as well as the promotion of free speech on the Internet, the
protection of personal privacy and public reputation, the prevention
of political cyberfraud, and the facilitation of political
communications more generally, particularly in the context of an
election campaign. This is obviously a complex pastiche of social
values that will need to be carefully balanced by policy makers as
the system develops.
The above discussion has also suggested practical approaches
that might be implemented alongside the UDRP and the ACPA to

355. As noted above, a temporary basis may be more appropriate for some
political names.

356. See supra Part IV.E.3.
357. See supra pp. 159-161 and note 281.
358.

New Generic Top-Level Domains, supra note 5,

23-25.
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protect some of these values. In particular, it has advocated the
adoption of a new classification scheme for different categories of
domain name disputes that raise various different legal and cultural
issues. This framework could be utilized in future development of
domain name laws and policies in order to differentiate traditional
bad-faith cybersquatting cases, which are adequately regulated
under the UDRP and the ACPA, from other kinds of complaints
regarding domain name registration and use. This would help in
developing a more comprehensive domain name policy than is
currently in use.
A new and more comprehensive policy may incorporate
elements of the various suggestions made above in relation to
Where
resolving different classes of domain name disputes.
competing legitimate interests are concerned, for example, ICANN
could develop a domain name sharing policy, which could be
facilitated privately by organizations like WIPO as a condition of
domain name registration. Alternatively, national legislatures could
Some
adopt similar policies for these classes of disputes.
competitions between legitimate interests might be resolved through
temporary compulsory licensing arrangements, such as political
versus private personal name disputes. Where two people have
legitimate interests in a name and one is a politician, as in the
kerryedwards.com situation, 3 9 a temporary compulsory licensing
agreement might be the optimal solution.
There are also those situations, as in the case of the
juliaroberts.com domain name3 60 and, perhaps, also some cultural
and religious words and phrases,36 ' where the complainant is not
seeking to put to better use a particular name than the original
registrant, but is, rather, seeking to restrict others from making an
objectionable use of the name. These situations potentially lend
themselves to the kind of veto system suggested earlier in this
Article.362 This system could operate somewhat like a restrictive
covenant system in a land title registry. ICANN or national
legislatures could establish a mechanism for registering
impermissible uses of particular domain names based on protecting
personal reputation, personal privacy, or cultural or religious
integrity in particular words or phrases. Alternatively, a domain
name "watch" or "defensive registration" service might be
introduced in the ".com," ".net," and ".org" spaces to protect personal
and cultural names against unauthorized incursions.3u
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

See supra notes 318, 334-36 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 253-63 and accompanying text.
See supra Part IV.F.
See supra pp. 159-161.
These are all preventive measures as opposed to curative measures, but
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A comprehensive domain name registration and regulation
system incorporating all of these elements would certainly be more
complex than the current system which mainly focuses on "classic,"
bad-faith cybersquatting, at least in the popular ".com," ".net," and
".org" domain spaces. However, the time may have arrived to
develop a more comprehensive approach to domain name disputes
that is able to protect important interests in domain names, aside
from those trademark holders already protected against bad-faith
incursions by cybersquatters. WIPO may, ultimately, be correct in
its opinion that international input is necessary in many of these
areas in order to ensure that the ensuing policies and procedures
adequately reflect emerging global norms, and such input will
certainly take some time. Nevertheless, in contrast to WIPO and
ICANN current priority lists, time may be of the essence in
identifying relevant norms and in developing national and global
mechanisms to promote important interests in domain names that
currently are inadequately protected. Failure to do so in a timely
manner will likely lead to an entrenchment of the notion that the
only values worthy of legal protection, with respect to the most
popular domain spaces, are those derived from traditional Western
commercial trademark interests. If these are the only interests
protected by national and global domain name policy, we risk the
chance that the Internet will fail to reach its full potential as a
global communications medium and, instead, be reduced to a bland,
if convenient, commercial marketplace.

they could be used, in concert with transfer and cancellation orders, in response
to a questionable registration, in order to avoid abuse of relevant domain names
in the face of bad-faith registrations. If a relevant domain name had not yet
been registered in the ".com, ".net," or ".org" space, the preventive measure
could, of course, be used without needing to resort to a curative measure.

